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COMPLETE LIST OF ALL PARTIES IN DISTRICT COURT 
St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company ("St. Paul") was one of the 
plaintiffs in this action. The District Court awarded summary judgment in Defendant 
American Casualty Company of Reading, PA's ("American Casualty") favor in 
connection with all plaintiffs' claims, including those of St. Paul. Both St. Paul and 
the University filed notices of appeal of that judgment entered in American Casualty's 
favor. However, on July 21, 2003, this Court entered its order dismissing St. Paul's 
appeal pursuant to a stipulation permitting St. Paul to withdraw its appeal. 
Accordingly, St. Paul is no longer a party to this appeal. 
St. Paul also named Nurse Troy Alan Broka ("Nurse Broka") as a defendant in 
this case. However, American Casualty understands that St. Paul never served Nurse 
Broka with its complaint, and Nurse Broka was not involved as a party in the District 
Court proceedings. 
PRO HAC VICE ADMISSION 
Alec M. Barinholtz and Jennifer Mathis of Ross, Dixon & Bell, L.L.P. in Irvine, 
California, were admitted pro hac vice in connection with this case pursuant to the 
District Court's Order dated February 6, 2002. [R. 74-75, 81-82, Addendum C]. 
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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal because it is an appeal from a final 
order or judgment entered by the trial court. Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(a). 
The trial court entered judgment in American Casualty's favor on December 30, 2002. 
After the plaintiffs filed notices of appeal, the Utah Supreme Court, on March 24, 
2003, assigned this appeal to the Court of Appeals. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED 
Whether the University can reallocate to and recover from American Casualty 
any portion of the University's settlement of a claim asserted against the University 
only, where the sole person insured by American Casualty in this instance - Nurse 
Broka - was not a party to that settled matter, had no claim or suit brought against him 
in that matter, and incurred no legal obligation to pay any amounts to anyone in 
connection with the settlement? 
Whether the University can circumvent the Utah Governmental Immunity Act 
by recovering from Nurse Broka's personal professional liability insurer, American 
Casualty, amounts that the University was statutorily obligated to pay, and for which it 
is statutorily prohibited from recovering directly from Nurse Broka? 
An appeal from an award of summary judgment is reviewed for correctness. 
Waddoups v. Amalgamated Sugar Co.. 2002 UT 69, fflll7-21, 54 P.3d 1054, 1060-
1061; Brown v. Weis. 871 P.2d 552, 559 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
The issues were preserved below at R. 156-183. 
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III. DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act (the "Act"), Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1, 
et seq. The pertinent provisions of the Act that are determinative in this matter are as 
follows:1 § 63-30-3 (1991, amended 2003); § 63-30-4 (1991, amended 2002); § 63-
30-28 (1991); § 63-30-36 (1991, amended 2002); § 63-30-37 (1987); § 63-30-38 
(1983). 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, 
DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW 
This case is a dispute over who should pay for the University's decision to 
settle a claim asserted only against the University by the widow of a patient who died 
while in the care of the University Hospital: the University, against whom the widow 
made and settled her claims, or the personal professional liability insurer of one of the 
nurses involved in the patient's care, against whom the widow did not make a specific 
claim, demand, or bring suit, and who incurred no legal obligations to contribute to the 
University's settlement or pay any other amounts. 
On approximately December 22, 1998, the University of Utah Hospital and the 
University of Utah (collectively, the "University") filed an action against "Continental 
1
 The full text of the current versions of these statutory provisions is included in 
Addendum A. Although certain of these provisions were amended subsequent to the 
time period that is at issue in this case, none of those amendments are relevant to the 
issues presented in this case. 
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Casualty dba CNA Insurance Companies." In its complaint, the University sought to 
recover the $1 million it paid under its Self-Insurance Trust to settle a claim made 
against it by Susan Hepworth, the widow of Abel Hepworth, who died while a patient 
at the University Hospital. The University's complaint alleges that the entire 
settlement was paid as a result of a medical incident arising out of the care rendered by 
American Casualty's insured, Troy Broka, who was a nurse employed at the 
University Hospital at the time of the incident. The University's complaint purports to 
state causes of action for (1) subrogation - breach of duty to defend; and (2) equitable 
subrogation. 
On or about October 18, 1999, St. Paul, the University's insurer, filed a 
complaint against Nurse Broka and American Casualty based on factual allegations 
essentially identical to those in the University's complaint. St. Paul's complaint 
purported to state causes of action against American Casualty for (1) subrogation -
breach of duty to defend; (2) equitable subrogation; and (3) contribution. St. Paul also 
purported to state a cause of action against Nurse Broka for subrogation, although 
American Casualty understands and believes that St. Paul never served Nurse Broka 
with its complaint. As damages, St. Paul (as the insurer for the University and all 
University employees, including Nurse Broka), sought from American Casualty the 
Continental Casualty Company is not the insurer that issued the policy to Nurse 
Broka, and CNA Insurance Companies is not a legally cognizable entity. Accordingly, 
the parties in this consolidated action stipulated to substitute American Casualty as the 
proper defendant. 
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$323,523 St. Paul contributed to the settlement of the Hepworth matter. On May 15, 
2001, the District Court ordered that both the University's case and St. Paul's case 
against American Casualty be consolidated. 
The University moved for summary judgment on February 26, 2002. St. Paul 
joined in that motion. American Casualty moved for summary judgment against the 
University and St. Paul on March 1, 2002. The District Court held oral argument on 
all parties' motions for summary judgment on September 6, 2002. 
On October 7, 2002, the District Court issued a Memorandum Decision 
granting summary judgment in American Casualty's favor and denying the 
University's and St. Paul's motions for summary judgment. On December 30, 2002, 
the District Court entered judgment in American Casualty's favor as to all of the 
University's and St. Paul's claims against American Casualty. (The District Court's 
Memorandum Decision is attached hereto as Addendum H). 
The University and St. Paul filed timely notices of appeal and each filed an 
opening brief. On July 21, 2003, this Court entered its order permitting St. Paul to 
voluntarily dismiss its appeal. [Order attached as Addendum I]. Accordingly, this 
appeal is proceeding only as to the University and American Casualty. 
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The Claim Against the University 
Nurse Troy Broka was a University Hospital employee from January 1, 1997 
until the end of April 1997. [R. 299 at % 2, Addendum G]. While Nurse Broka was 
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employed at the University Hospital, he was one of the nurses who cared for Abel 
Hepworth, a neurological patient at the University Hospital in April 1997. [R. 3 at If 9, 
Addendum B]. According to the University's complaint in this action, on or about 
April 10, 1997, Nurse Broka negligently administered excess intravenous fluids to Mr. 
Hepworth, allegedly causing or contributing to Mr. Hepworth's death four days later. 
[R. 3 at ffij 10-11, Addendum B]. The University acknowledges that Nurse Broka was 
acting within the course and scope of his employment at the time of his alleged 
negligent conduct, and has never alleged or asserted to the contrary. [R. 94 at f 3]. 
Soon after Mr. Hepworth died, his widow, on her own behalf and on behalf of 
her two minor children, advised the University Hospital that she would be 
commencing a lawsuit against the University. [R. 3 at f 12, Addendum B]. There is 
no evidence Mrs. Hepworth ever made any demand directly on Nurse Broka. Indeed, 
as stated in Nurse Broka's affidavit filed with the District Court in support of 
American Casualty's Motion for Summary Judgment, Nurse Broka never received 
notice that anyone, including the Hepworths, intended to pursue him in connection 
with Mr. Hepworth's death.3 [R. 299 at fflf 4-5, Addendum G]. 
3
 In opposing American Casualty's summary judgment motion in the District 
Court, the University submitted an affidavit of its risk manager, Lynda Faldmo, who 
asserted that Mrs. Hepworth "referred" to Nurse Broka's alleged negligence in her 
discussions with the University. [R. 109, Addendum D]. Putting aside the hearsay 
problems with this affidavit, it remains undisputed that, although Mrs. Hepworth may 
have believed that her husband's death was caused in part by Nurse Broka's alleged 
negligence, she only made a demand on the University and not on Nurse Broka. 
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The University and its insurer, St. Paul, began immediate settlement 
negotiations with Mrs. Hepworth. While engaged in those negotiations, the University 
wrote to Nurse Broka's personal professional liability insurer, American Casualty, 
requesting that American Casualty participate in the settlement of the Hepworth matter 
[R. 3 at Tf 14, Addendum B]. On July 17, 1997, American Casualty responded, stating 
in part that, "Mr. Broka is an employee of the University of Utah Health Sciences 
Center and as such should be defended under their policy. We respectfully decline to 
participate in the settlement of this matter." [R. 292, Addendum F]. American 
Casualty also advised the University that American Casualty's obligations, if any, 
would be excess, at best. Id. 
The University, on behalf of itself and all of its employees, eventually reached a 
settlement with Mrs. Hepworth on or about March 31, 1998. [R. 4, Addendum B]. 
According to the settlement agreement,4 the Hepworths settled their potential wrongful 
death suit with the University for a total of $ 1,323,523. The University paid $ 1 
million out of its Self-Insurance Trust and St. Paul paid $323,523 of the $5 million 
policy it issued to the University. [R. 4 at fflj 19-20, Addendum B]. Nurse Broka was 
4
 Apart from the parties, the amounts paid, and the general scope of the releases, 
the settlement agreement itself was not part of the record in the District Court because 
it contains a confidentiality provision. If the Court would like to review the 
agreement, American Casualty will submit it for the Court's in camera review, if the 
University has no objection. 
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not a party to the settlement and is nowhere specifically mentioned by name in the 
settlement agreement. 
On April 23, 1998, counsel for the University again wrote to American 
Casualty, advising that it had settled the matter and that it intended to seek recovery of 
the settlement amount from American Casualty. [R. 293-294]. American Casualty 
continued to decline to contribute to the University's settlement with the Hepworths. 
2. The Lawsuits Against American Casualty 
On approximately December 22, 1998, the University filed this action, seeking 
to recover the $1 million that it paid under its Self-Insurance Trust to settle the 
Hepworth matter. [R. 1-6, Addendum B]. The complaint alleges that the entire 
settlement paid to the Hepworths was paid as a result of a medical incident arising out 
of the care rendered by Nurse Broka. [R. 5 at ^ 27, Addendum B]. The University 
purports to state causes of action for (1) subrogation - breach of duty to defend, 
alleging that American Casualty breached its duty to defend Nurse Broka, resulting in 
the University incurring attorneys fees and costs of $8,459.20 (despite the fact that the 
Hepworths never made any specific demands for money or services against Nurse 
Broka and Nurse Broka never incurred any defense expenses related to that 
settlement);5 and (2) equitable subrogation, alleging that American Casualty failed to 
pay all amounts for which Nurse Broka became legally obligated to pay as a result of 
5
 Nurse Broka's affidavit filed in support of American Casualty's summary 
judgment motion attests to both of these facts. [R. 299 at ffl[ 4-7, Addendum G]. 
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injuries caused by a medical incident arising from care provided by Nurse Broka5 in 
the amount of $1 million. Id. 
St. Paul followed suit. On or about October 18, 1999, St. Paul filed a complaint 
against Nurse Broka and American Casualty, based on factual allegations essentially 
identical to those in the University's complaint, and purporting to state causes of 
action against American Casualty for (1) subrogation - breach of duty to defend; (2) 
equitable subrogation; and (3) contribution. [R. 281-288]. St. Paul also purported to 
state a cause of action against Nurse Broka for subrogation. As damages, St. Paul 
sought the $323,523 it allegedly contributed to the settlement of the Hepworth matter. 
[R. 287]. On May 15, 2001, both cases against American Casualty were consolidated. 
[R. 45-47]. 
3. The Policies 
American Casualty issued Professional Nurses Liability Program Policy No. N-
125381620 to Nurse Broka for the policy period April 22, 1996 to April 22, 1997 (the 
"American Casualty Policy"), with a $1 million limit of liability per each "medical 
incident," $3 million aggregate. [R. 266, Addendum E]. Subject to all of its terms, 
limitations, conditions, exclusions and endorsements, the American Casualty Policy 
provides coverage for all amounts that Nurse Broka becomes "legally obligated to pay 
as a result of injury or damage caused by a medical incident by [Broka]." [R. 273 at 
§ 1(A), Addendum E] (boldface in original). The American Casualty Policy defines 
"claim" to mean "the receipt by [Broka] of a demand for money or services naming 
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[Broka] and alleging a medical incident." [R. 275 at § IV, Addendum E] (boldface 
in original). 
The American Casualty Policy was issued to Nurse Broka only. [R. 266, 
Addendum E]. There is no coverage available under the American Casualty Policy 
for the University or for any of its other employees. Nurse Broka purchased the 
American Casualty Policy effective April 22, 1996, before he ever was employed by 
the University. Id [See also R. 299 at Tf 2, Addendum G]. 
The University and its employees, including Nurse Broka, are afforded 
coverage by St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company Health Care Facility 
Umbrella Excess Liability Policy No. 566UH0042, issued to University of Utah 
Health Sciences (including the University of Utah Hospital) for the policy period July 
1, 1995 to July 1, 1998 (the "St. Paul Policy"). [R. 185-189]. The St. Paul Policy's 
limit of liability is $5 million, excess of the Hospital's $1 million self-insured 
retention.6 [R. 200-201]. The St. Paul Policy provides coverage, in pertinent part, for 
6
 The University satisfied its $1 million retention under the St. Paul Policy 
through a Self-Insurance Trust that the University has established to cover such 
liabilities. [R. 146-151; R. 4 at f^ 9, Addendum B]. The Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act specifically provides that a governmental entity may self-insure to meet its 
obligations under the Act. See § 63-30-28 (1991) ("Any governmental entity within 
the state may purchase commercial insurance, self-insure, or self-insure and purchase 
excess commercial insurance in excess of the statutory limits of this chapter against 
any risk created or recognized by this chapter or any action for which a governmental 
entity or its employee may be held liable . . . [and] may self-insure with respect to 
specified classes of claims by establishing a trust account") (Addendum A). 
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the Hospital and for its "present and former employees . . . while working . . . within 
the scope of their duties." [R. 207]. 
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This case arises out of the University's attempt to collect a windfall to which it 
is not entitled at the expense of one of its nurse's personal liability insurers, American 
Casualty, and at the same time to craft an end-run around the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act (the "Act"). 
The University's efforts fail for at least two independent reasons. 
First, as the District Court correctly held, none of American Casualty's 
coverage obligations to Nurse Broka were triggered by the University's settlement 
with the Hepworths because "Nurse Broka never had any claims made against him and 
never became legally obligated to pay anything to the Hepworths in connection with 
the University and St. Paul's settlement of the University's liability to the Hepworths." 
[R. 503, Addendum H]. This holding is consistent with the law in the majority of 
jurisdictions that recognize when a malpractice claim is asserted only against a 
hospital and not against its employees whose alleged negligence caused an injury, the 
employee's personal professional liability insurer has no coverage obligations. Not 
only was no "claim" made against Nurse Broka within the definition of the American 
Casualty Policy (the Hepworth's only demand was against the University), but Nurse 
Broka never became legally obligated to pay any amount in connection with the 
University's settlement with the Hepworths. The District Court enforced the 
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American Casualty Policy as written, and there is no reason to do otherwise in this 
case. 
Second, as a University employee, Nurse Broka never could have become 
legally obligated to pay any amounts in connection with his alleged negligence to Mr. 
Hepworth, because the Act insulates him from personal liability and requires that the 
University defend and indemnify him. Not only does the Act require the University to 
defend and indemnify its employees in connection with negligent acts committed in 
the course and scope of their employment, it also forecloses the University from 
seeking indemnity for losses suffered through the negligent conduct of those 
employees. To further effectuate the legislative intent that the primary obligation to 
defend and indemnify government employees shall rest with government employers, 
the Utah Supreme Court has held that this obligation cannot be passed off to the 
personal liability insurers of the government entity's employees. Gulf Ins. Co. v. 
Horace Mann Ins. Co., 567 P.2d 158 (Utah 1977). Despite the clear state of Utah law 
in this regard, that is exactly what the University is trying to do here. 
The University attempts to avoid the correct result reached by the District Court 
by arguing that if coverage is unavailable under American Casualty's Policy for the 
University's settlement of the Hepworth matter, coverage under that Policy somehow 
is rendered illusory. The University further asserts that when American Casualty 
initially denied coverage six years ago, it waived its ability to rely on the clear terms of 
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the American Casualty Policy's coverage agreement, and the ability to rely on the 
provisions of the Act. Both contentions are without merit. 
As for the alleged illusory coverage, the University essentially argues that 
personal insurance issued to a Utah government employee is illusory if that insurance 
is not available to reimburse a government entity for discharging its statutory 
obligation under the Act to defend and indemnify its employees, against whom the 
government has no recourse. The flaw in this argument is that not only has it been 
effectively rejected by the Utah Supreme Court, but it also ignores that the American 
Casualty Policy issued to Nurse Broka did provide professional liability coverage to 
him in many circumstances in which he otherwise would not be immune from suit or 
entitled to indemnity from the University. 
Turning next to the University's waiver argument, the University has not 
proven any of the required elements to demonstrate that American Casualty waived 
any right under its Policy or Utah law. American Casualty never intentionally 
relinquished a known coverage defense, nor did it waive the requirement that the 
University prove in the first instance that the underlying matter came within the scope 
of the American Casualty Policy's insuring agreement - a burden that Utah law places 
on the University or anyone else seeking to establish coverage. 
Additionally, the immunities pursuant to the Act are not policy provisions or 
exclusions that American Casualty can waive. The University - which is not even 
American Casualty's insured - cannot create coverage by estoppel under 
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circumstances where coverage is not otherwise available, nor can it use a waiver 
argument to bypass its statutory obligations. 
In summary, affirming the District Court's judgment will ensure that the 
University does not avoid its statutorily-imposed obligations to defend and indemnify 
its employees via an attempt to recover from Nurse Broka's personal insurer amounts 
that by statute the University cannot recover from Nurse Broka. The University's 
settlement with the Hepworths resolved the University's own liability as well as the 
liability of all of the other University employees involved in the care and treatment of 
Mr. Hepworth, including but not limited to Nurse Broka. Although the University 
contends that in settling, it shouldered obligations that belonged to American Casualty, 
under the facts of this case and controlling Utah law, the University did no more than 
it was obligated to do. For these reasons, as discussed below, the correct result of the 
District Court should be affirmed. 
VI. ARGUMENT 
A. BECAUSE NURSE BROKA NEVER BECAME LEGALLY 
OBLIGATED TO PAY ANY AMOUNTS IN THE HEPWORTH 
SETTLEMENT, THE UNIVERSITY IS BARRED FROM 
RECOVERING AGAINST AMERICAN CASUALTY. 
The American Casualty Policy's Coverage Agreement provides that American 
Casualty will pay amounts that Nurse Broka becomes "legally obligated to pay as a 
result of injury or damage caused by a medical incident" for which he is responsible. 
[R. 273 at § 1(A), Addendum E] (italics added; boldface in original.). The only 
obligations that arose out of the Hepworth matter were the University's obligation to 
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pay its self-insured retention and St. Paul's obligation to indemnify the University for 
amounts in excess of that retention. Nurse Broka never incurred or paid any defense 
expenses or incurred any personal obligations or any liability whatsoever. No 
demands were made against Nurse Broka that would have triggered any of American 
Casualty's coverage obligations. 
Although the University asserts that Mrs. Hepworth "referred" to Nurse 
Broka's alleged negligence during settlement discussions, the fact remains that Mrs. 
Hepworth chose to pursue relief against the University alone, which by law would 
have been required to defend and indemnify Nurse Broka even if she had made claims 
against him. Put simply, the risk that a covered "claim" might be made against Nurse 
Broka in connection with the Hepworth matter for which Nurse Broka would become 
legally obligated to pay (and, therefore, entitled to coverage from American Casualty) 
never materialized. 
1. The University Became Subrogated to Nothing 
The University is proceeding on a theory that it became subrogated to Nurse 
Broka's rights under the American Casualty Policy and, accordingly, steps into his 
shoes and succeeds to his rights under the American Casualty Policy. Consequently, 
the University has no greater rights than Nurse Broka would have against American 
Casualty. See generally State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. 
Co., 912 P.2d 983, 985 (Utah 1996) (doctrine of equitable subrogation "allows a 
person or entity which pays the loss or satisfies the claim of another under a legally 
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cognizable obligation or interest to step into the shoes of the other person and assert 
that person's rights"). 
The absence of any legal obligation on Nurse Broka's part to pay anything to 
anyone not only forecloses his right to indemnification, but likewise forecloses the 
University's rights as his putative subrogee. 
a) The Phrase "Legally Obligated to Pay" is Not 
Ambiguous 
The University contends that the phrase "legally obligated to pay" as it is used 
in the American Casualty Policy is ambiguous, because "[i]t is reasonable to read this 
language in its common law context to mean that if Nurse Broka negligently injures 
someone (as Mrs. Hepworth contended), he is legally obligated to pay." See 
University's Brief at 20. The University acknowledges that Nurse Broka's negligence 
never was established but essentially argues nevertheless that the mere allegation that 
Nurse Broka was negligent is sufficient for this Court to find that Nurse Broka became 
legally obligated to pay some amount, thus triggering indemnity coverage under the 
American Casualty Policy. The University is wrong. 
Putting aside that the University raised this argument for the first time on 
appeal, the University has taken the phrase entirely out of context and has construed it 
in a fashion that conflates the duty to defend, which is triggered based on allegations 
contained in a claim, and the duty to indemnify, which is triggered upon a 
determination of the insured's liability for a covered loss. It is noteworthy that the 
University cites no legal authority in support of this proposition. This is no surprise, 
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as the University's argument is at odds with both Utah law and any reasonable 
construction of the American Casualty Policy. 
Utah courts have applied and enforced insuring agreement provisions 
containing similar language. See, e.g.. Fire Ins. Exch. v. Therkelsen, 2001 UT 48, f7, 
27 P.3d 555, 558 (finding no indemnification coverage under homeowners' insurance 
policy providing that insurer would pay "those damages which an insured becomes 
legally obligated to pay because of bodily injury or property damage resulting from an 
occurrence to which this coverage applies," despite fact that allegation of negligence 
may have triggered defense coverage). The duty to indemnify is not based on the 
allegations made against the insured, but on whether the action against the insured is 
actually covered. Id.; see also Simmons v. Farmers Ins. Group, 877 P.2d 1255, 1258 
n.3 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) ("Generally, insurers have a duty to defend any complaint 
alleging facts which, if proven, would render the insurer liable for indemnification of 
its insured. The duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify because it is 
antecedent to and independent of the duty to indemnify") (emphasis added, citations 
omitted). 
In Therkelsen, for example, the insured was entitled to a defense for negligence 
claims asserted against him, but ultimately was not entitled to indemnification 
coverage because his conduct was found to be intentional, and thus outside of scope of 
the policy's insuring agreement requiring that any legal obligation to pay be caused by 
an "occurrence" - i.e., an accident. Citing to the policy's insuring agreement (which 
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contained the "legally obligated to pay" language), the Utah Supreme Court affirmed 
the award of summary judgment in the insurer's favor on the indemnification issue. 
Utah's decisions are consistent with those from other jurisdictions that likewise 
recognize that indemnification coverage simply is not triggered absent some 
established obligation of the insured in the underlying litigation. See, e,g., Armstrong 
World Indus., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 690, 743-44 (Cal. 
App. 1996) (duty to indemnify, as opposed to duty to defend, "cannot be determined in 
advance of the insured's underlying liability The duty to indemnify . . . arises 
when the insured's underlying liability is established") (citations omitted); Ledford v. 
Gutosjd, 877 P.2d 80, 85 (Oregon 1994) ("In order for the duty to indemnify to arise, 
the insured must be liable for harm or injury that is covered by the policy. The record 
in this case does not indicate whether Kuhl was in fact liable to Ledford for malicious 
prosecution [I] f Kuhl was not in fact liable for malicious prosecution, there is no 
duty to indemnify because Kuhl was not legally obligated to pay money to Ledford"); 
Alaska Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Industrial Indem. Co.. 757 P.2d 1052, 1054 (Alaska 1988) 
(where employer was dismissed from wrongful death action prior to any judicial 
determination of its fault, the fact that a jury subsequently apportioned 30% of the 
liability to the employer in a proceeding in which the employer was not a party was 
insufficient to trigger an indemnity obligation under a policy that required that the 
employer become "legally obligated to pay" damages, as there was no determination 
of the employer's fault that was binding on the employer). 
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The University's construction also is at odds with other portions of the 
American Casualty Policy that make clear that the legal obligation to pay envisioned 
in the American Casualty Policy's insuring agreement is an obligation that must be 
fixed by a judgment against Nurse Broka following an actual trial, or by a settlement 
agreement to which Nurse Broka and American Casualty were parties. For example, 
the American Casualty Policy's "Legal Action Limitation" section provides in relevant 
part: 
You may not bring any legal action against us concerning this policy until: 
A. you have fully complied with all provisions of this policy; and 
B, the amount of your obligation to pay has been decided. Such 
amount can be set by judgment against you after actual trial or by 
written agreement between you, us and the claimant. 
[R. 270 at § X, Addendum E].7 
When the phrase "legally obligated to pay" in the American Casualty Policy's 
insuring agreement is read in conjunction with the "Legal Action Limitation" 
provision, it is clear that the only reasonable interpretation of that phrase requires that 
there be a determination of Nurse Broka's liability via a judgment following an actual 
trial, or an agreement between Nurse Broka, American Casualty and a loss claimant 
fixing that liability. The mere allegation that he was liable does not suffice. This 
This provision was not referred to in the parties' briefing below. American 
Casualty points out this provision in response to the University's argument - raised for 
the first time in its appeal brief- that the mere allegation that Nurse Broka was 
negligent can somehow result in a legal obligation to pay. 
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construction is consistent with Utah law, which requires that the terms of an insurance 
contract be construed as a whole in order to give effect to all provisions of the policy. 
Nielsen v. O'Reilly, 848 P.2d 664, 665 (Utah 1992) ("Specifically, the terms of 
insurance contracts, as well as all contracts, are to be interpreted in accordance with 
their usually accepted meanings and should be read as a whole, in an attempt to 
harmonize and give effect to all of the contract provisions"). 
b) The University Has Not Met the Requirements For 
Equitable Subrogation 
The cases that the University relies on for its argument that it is entitled to 
recover based on principles of equitable subrogation all have one requirement in 
common - that there be some coverage obligation on the part of the insurer against 
whom subrogation is sought in the first instance. In other words, Utah law requires 
that there be some coverage obligation on the part of American Casualty to indemnify 
Nurse Broka as an initial matter before the University, as his subrogee, can seek 
recovery. See Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 931 P.2d 127, 136 
(Utah 1997) (discussing requirements for equitable subrogation generally, and 
rejecting in part one insurer's equitable subrogation claim in connection with defense 
costs it had paid, because other insurer had no coverage obligations for underlying 
action). As noted above, subrogation rights are purely derivative, and the University 
succeeds only to those rights that Nurse Broka possessed against American Casualty 
and has no greater rights. State Farm, 912 P.2d at 985. 
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In addition, before subrogation rights arise, it must be shown that the party 
against whom subrogation rights are asserted was primarily liable to pay the claim or 
loss. State Farm, 912 P.2d at 985; Sharon Steel 931 P.2d at 137 (insurer can only 
recover under a subrogation theory if it pays amounts that were "owed by another . . . 
who ought to have paid it"). 
Within this analytical framework there is no scenario under the facts of this 
case that would have triggered American Casualty's coverage obligations to Nurse 
Broka that, in turn, would permit the University to "step into his shoes" as subrogee. 
The insuring agreement of the American Casualty Policy provides coverage 
only for amounts Nurse Broka becomes "legally obligated to pay" as damages caused 
by his rendering or failing to render profesional services, and further provides for the 
o 
defense of "claims" made against him. However, (1) Mrs. Hepworth never made any 
demands directly to Nurse Broka for anything, (2) Nurse Broka did not incur any costs 
to defend himself in connection with Mrs. Hepworth's claims against the University, 
and (3) there has been no judicial determination of his legal liability to the Hepworths 
nor was there any settlement to which he was a named party that imposes any 
obligation on him to pay anything to the Hepworths. [R. 299, Addendum G]. For 
these reasons, American Casualty's obligations to defend and indemnify Nurse Broka 
8
 The American Casualty Policy defines "claim" to mean "the receipt by [Broka] 
of a demand for money or services naming [Broka] and alleging a medical incident" 
(bold in original). [R. 275 at § IV, Addendum E]. 
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never matured and he had neither the right nor the ability to demand that American 
Casualty defend or indemnify him. In fact, he never made such a demand. Id. 
An additional problem with the University's equitable subrogation theory is that 
American Casualty was not primarily liable to pay for the University's settlement with 
the Hepworths. As discussed infra at pp. 30-40, under the facts of this case, the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act effectively renders the University (and, by extension, its 
insurer) solely liable for Nurse Broka's negligent conduct in the course of his 
employment. Under the Act, Nurse Broka is entitled to absolute indemnity from the 
University and the University is precluded from obtaining any recovery from Nurse 
Broka or American Casualty. Accordingly, the University does not occupy a position 
that is equitably superior to American Casualty's position. 
Even indulging in the presumption that the University's liability to the 
Hepworths derived from Nurse Broka's actions in whole or in part (which American 
Casualty does not concede), it was the University and only the University that incurred 
any liability in connection with the Hepworth matter. The American Casualty Policy 
provides no coverage whatsoever for the University's own liability, no matter its 
origin. As a result, the District Court correctly ruled that American Casualty is entitled 
to summary judgment as a matter of law on the University's claims. 
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2. The Majority Of Jurisdictions Addressing the Indemnity 
Issue Before This Court Have Decided the Issue in American 
Casualty's Favor 
One of the crucial issues on this appeal - whether a demand made solely against 
a hospital based on the alleged negligence of its employee obligates the employee's 
personal liability insurer to contribute to the hospital's settlement of that claim - has 
been addressed by a handful of jurisdictions, which have ruled overwhelmingly in 
favor of the employee's personal liability insurer. In contrast, the sole legal authority 
relied on by the University in connection with this issue consists of a decision of the 
Arizona Court of Appeal that applied a rule of law unique to Arizona, is based on a 
dubious legal foundation, and that never has been relied upon by any published 
decision of any court in any jurisdiction outside of Arizona for that same proposition. 
Four out of five jurisdictions that have reported cases addressing the issue 
before this Court have decided it in favor of American Casualty's position here. In 
each of those cases, the courts held that even where a hospital is held liable based in 
whole or in part on the acts or omissions of its employee, if no claim is made or suit 
brought against the employee by the injured party, there is no basis to recover from the 
employee's personal professional liability insurer. 
California was the most recent jurisdiction to decide this issue on facts virtually 
identical to those in the present case in American Continental Insurance Co. v. 
American Casualty Co., 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 632 (Cal. App. 2001) ("ACIC (California)"). 
There, American Continental Insurance Company ("ACIC") sought contribution from 
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American Casualty for an underlying settlement that ACIC paid on behalf of an 
insured hospital based upon the alleged negligence of one of the hospital's nurses. 
The nurse was an insured under the ACIC policy and also had her own individual 
professional liability policy from American Casualty on terms identical to the one in 
this case. The underlying lawsuit, however, did not name the nurse as a defendant nor 
did the underlying plaintiffs assert a claim directly against her. ACIC settled the 
underlying claim "on behalf of the Hospital and its employees" (which included the 
nurse). American Casualty declined to contribute to the settlement. ACIC sued 
American Casualty for contribution based on the theory that, because the hospital's 
liability was derivative of the nurse's conduct, both of the nurse's insurers ought to 
contribute to the underlying settlement. ACIC (California), 103 Cal Rptr. 2d at 635-
36.9 
In a lengthy and well-reasoned opinion written by one of the leading authorities 
on insurance coverage law, the California Court of Appeal rejected the argument. The 
court observed that because no "claim" was asserted against the nurse by the 
underlying plaintiffs, and because the underlying lawsuit was settled by ACIC 
(meaning that the nurse did not become "legally obligated" to pay damages), 
9
 Although the University is proceeding under a subrogation and not a 
contribution theory, the analysis is essentially the same insofar as both require a 
determination of whether the employee's personal liability policy ever was triggered in 
the first instance. 
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American Casualty's duty to defend and indemnify the nurse never arose. ACIC 
(California), 103 Cal Rptr. 2d at 638-39. On these facts, the court held: 
Obviously, if the obligation to provide coverage under the 
American Casualty policy never arose, then American 
Casualty never at any time had any contractual obligation 
with respect to the Gavino claim or action. And, as we 
have extensively discussed, if there was no contractual 
obligation, then there can be no successful assertion of a 
claim for equitable contribution by ACIC merely because 
it chose, in the pursuit of its own interests and obligations, 
to settle the Gavino action by purchasing the peace of its 
insureds, [the] Hospital and the Hospital's employees. 
Under the facts of this case, American Casualty simply 
was not a "co-obligor" who shared a liability with ACIC. 
American Casualty never had any liability. 
Id. at 639. Of similar import are St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Continental 
Casualty Co., 827 P.2d 1366, 1367 (Or. App. 1992) (rejecting contribution action 
brought by hospital's insurer against nurse's insurer, reasoning that because no claim 
was brought against the nurse, the nurse's policy was not implicated); Missouri 
Professional Liability Ins. Ass'n v. American Cas. Co. of Reading, PA, 760 F. Supp. 
783, 786 (W.D. Mo. 1991) (rejecting contribution claim brought by hospital's insurer 
against nurse's insurer, reasoning that, because the nurse was not a party to the 
underlying action, she was never "legally obligated to pay anything" and her policy 
was not triggered); Medical Malpractice Ins. Ass'n v. Medical Liability Mut. Ins. Co., 
86 A.D.2d 476, 481 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (rejecting subrogation and contribution 
claims made against doctors' insurer by hospital's insurer, reasoning that only the 
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hospital had been named in the suit and the doctors' policies did not cover the 
hospital). 
As these cases recognize, the risk that a professional liability policy covers is 
that the insured will be sued and become legally obligated to pay damages because of 
his or her professional negligence. These cases further recognize, as did the District 
Court here, that where the insured is not party to a claim or any other proceeding that 
seeks to hold the insured legally liable to pay damages, the risk insured against never 
materializes. Here, because the University was the only entity against whom the 
Hepworths specifically sought redress, and was the only entity that incurred a legal 
obligation to pay the Hepworths via their settlement agreement, the theoretical risk 
that Nurse Broka might be sued for medical negligence and become legally obligated 
to the Hepworths never materialized. 
The sole authority that the University relies upon is a discredited line of 
authority from Arizona, the only jurisdiction to have reported a decision on this issue 
the other way. Mutual Ins. Co. of Arizona v. American Cas. Co. of Reading, PA, 938 
P.2d 71 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996). The Mutual Ins. Co. case - which no published 
decision outside of Arizona has followed - relied on the reasoning of an earlier 
Arizona Court of Appeal decision entitled American Continental Insurance Co. v. 
American Casualty Co. of Reading, PA, 903 P.2d 609 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) ("ACIC 
(Arizona)"). Both Arizona decisions held on facts similar to those at bar that the 
nurse's insurer was required to contribute to a settlement paid by the hospital's insurer, 
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even though no claim was made against the nurse and the nurse incurred no legal 
obligation to the injured claimant. Both decisions bolstered their reasoning by relying 
on a decision of the California Court of Appeal, which the Arizona courts mis-read to 
stand for the proposition that insurers' obligations vis-a-vis each other do not depend 
on whether their mutual insured actually had claims asserted against him in the 
underlying action for which he was exposed to legal liability. Mutual Ins. Co., 938 
P.2d at 75; ACIC (Arizona! 903 P.2d at 611. 
However, a few years after the ACIC (Arizona) decision, the California Court 
of Appeal had occasion to review the Arizona court's interpretation of California law, 
and noted that "[t]o the extent that [the Arizona court relied on California law], the 
Arizona court wrongly applied California law " ACIC (California), 103 Cal. Rptr. 
2dat642n.l3. 
The Arizona court's misconstruction and misapplication of California law 
erodes the already shaky foundation on which the ACIC (Arizona) decision rests and 
provides a further basis to confine these aberrant Arizona decisions to Arizona and not 
to import them or their flawed logic into Utah. 
3. The "Claim" Issue Is A Red Herring 
The University devotes a great deal of its opening brief to an argument that was 
apparently not crucial to the District Court's judgment in favor of American Casualty, 
nor is it essential to this Court's resolution of the case - whether a "claim" was made 
against Nurse Broka within the meaning of American Casualty's Policy, which affects 
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American Casualty's duty to defend Nurse Broka, not its duty to indemnify him. 
According to the University, "[t]he absence of a claim made directly to Nurse Broka is 
an irrelevant technicality," and the fact that the University advised American Casualty 
of the Hepworths' demand on the University was enough to put American Casualty 
"on notice" and to trigger coverage under the American Casualty Policy. See 
University' s Brief at p. 11. 
The University effectively concedes that any indemnification obligations under 
the American Casualty Policy are governed by its insuring agreement, which states 
that indemnification coverage is available only for amounts that Nurse Broka becomes 
"legally obligated to pay." See University's brief at p. 12 (quoting Policy's coverage 
agreement and acknowledging that "[t]he indemnification obligation arises when 
Nurse Broka is 'legally obligated to pay' as a result of his negligence"). Because 
Nurse Broka never became legally obligated to pay anything - regardless of whether a 
"claim" was made against him - American Casualty's indemnification obligations 
never were triggered. The District Court noted this as well: 
Nurse Broka never had any claim made against him and 
never became legally obligated to pay anything to the 
Hepworths in connection with the University's and St. 
Paul's settlement of the University's liability to the 
10
 The only significance of the existence of a "claim" is whether American 
Casualty had an obligation to defend Nurse Broka, whose undisputed Affidavit 
submitted to the District Court acknowledged that he neither requested a defense nor 
incurred any defense costs in connection with the Hepworth matter. [R. 299 at Tflj 6-7, 
Addendum G]. 
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Hepworths. Accordingly, none of American's obligations 
under the policy it issued to Nurse Broka ever matured. 
Consequently, American is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law. 
[R. 503, Addendum H].11 
Notwithstanding that indemnity obligations are triggered only upon there being 
a legal obligation for Nurse Broka to pay damages as a result of his negligence, the 
University makes a strained attempt to prove that a "claim" was made against Nurse 
Broka. That issue, however, is completely irrelevant to whether the American 
Casualty Policy provided indemnity coverage for the University's settlement of the 
Hepworths' claims against it. 
The University argues that, although Nurse Broka never received notice of a 
"claim," the University did, and because it effectively stands in his shoes as a subrogee 
vis-a-vis American Casualty, the University's receipt of a claim and its demand that 
American Casualty participate in the underlying settlement satisfies the American 
Casualty Policy's "claim" requirement. See University's Brief at pp. 12-16. The 
11
 The University seemingly has misapprehended this aspect of the District 
Court's opinion, suggesting in its brief at p. 19 that the District Court apparently 
accepted American Casualty's arguments that were based on application of the Act, 
even though the District Court expressly declined to reach that issue. [R. 504 at n. 8, 
Addendum H]. While the District Court would have been correct to grant American 
Casualty's motion based on the application of the Governmental Immunity Act, it 
determined the lack of coverage solely on the basis of the fact that Nurse Broka never 
became legally obligated to pay any amounls in connection with the Hepworth 
settlement, essentially adopting the rationale of the cases discussed at pp. 20-24 of this 
brief. [R. 496-505, Addendum H]. These cases provide an independent, and legally 
correct, basis to support the District Court's ruling. 
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University's attempt to transmute Mrs. Hepworth's demands on the University into 
demands upon Nurse Broka, and then to contend that because the University is Nurse 
Broka's subrogee, that a "claim" was made against Nurse Broka, is both novel and 
remarkable, albeit unfounded in fact or controlling law. Tellingly, the only case that 
the University cites to support this novel proposition is Hansen v. Barmore, 779 P.2d 
1360 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989), which is inapposite as it concerned whether a third party's 
notice to the insurer of a claim against an insured satisfied an automobile policy's 
notice requirement. Id. at 1363-1364. That case had nothing to do with whether there 
was a "claim" under the terms of the automobile policy, nor does it bear on whether 
there was a "claim" within the meaning of the American Casualty Policy. 
In any event, the existence of a "claim" against Nurse Broka is not the proper 
focus of this litigation and apparently did not factor into the District Court's ultimate 
conclusion that the reason American Casualty was entitled to summary judgment is 
because its insured, Nurse Broka, never became legally obligated to pay anything to 
anyone in connection with the Hepworth matter. 
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B. UNDER THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT, 
NURSE BROKA COULD NOT HAVE BEEN HELD 
PERSONALLY LIABLE AND THERE IS NO RECOURSE 
AGAINST HIM OR HIS INSURER. 
As an independent basis for non-coverage, American Casualty asserted in its 
summary judgment motion in the District Court that its obligations under the 
American Casualty Policy were not triggered because the Act required the University 
to defend and indemnify Nurse Broka, without recourse to any personal insurance that 
may have been available to him. Although the District Court did not reach this issue, 
it may be considered on appeal, as this Court may affirm the District Court's decision 
if it is correct on any ground, even on grounds that the District Court did not address: 
It is well settled that an appellate court may affirm the 
judgment appealed from if it is sustainable on any legal 
ground or theory apparent on the record, even though such 
ground or theory differs from that stated by the trial court 
to be the basis of its ruling or action, and this is true even 
though such ground or theory is not urged or argued on 
appeal by appellee, was not raised in the lower court, and 
was not considered or passed on by the lower court. 
Bailey v. Bavles, 2002 UT 58, ^ [10, 52 P.3d 1158, 1161 (citations omitted). 
1. The Act Requires that the University Defend and Indemnify 
Its Employees Without Recourse 
Under the Act, the University cannot seek indemnification from Nurse Broka or 
from his insurer, American Casualty. The Act provides that Nurse Broka - as an 
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employee of the University Hospital - could not have been held personally liable for 
any negligent acts or omissions occurring during the performance of his duties and 
within the scope of his employment, because his employer, the University Hospital, is 
a governmental entity. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-4 (1991, amended 2002, Addendum 
A).13 The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that the University and the University 
Hospital are state entities for purposes of the Act, and that their employees likewise 
are state employees. See Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517, 519 (Utah 1980) (claim against 
University of Utah Medical Center is claim against governmental entity); Wright v. 
University of Utah, 876 P.2d 380, 383 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (applying Act as to 
University employee); Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3 (1991, amended 2003, Addendum 
A) (specifically providing governmental immunity for state-owned university 
hospitals). Because the Act's immunity extends to Nurse Broka, he never could have 
The University acknowledges that Nurse Broka was an employee of the 
Hospital who was working "in the course of providing care to Mr. Hepworth" at the 
time of the alleged negligent conduct toward Mr. Hepworth. [R. 94 at j^ 3; R. 2-3 at ffl[ 
8-9, Addendum B]. Accordingly, there is no dispute that Nurse Broka was acting 
within the scope of his employment for the University at the time of the incident. 
13
 The Act provides in part that, in connection with governmental employees, "no 
employee may be held personally liable for acts or omissions occurring during the 
performance of the employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or under color 
of authority, unless it is established that the employee acted or failed to act due to 
fraud or malice." § 63-30-4(4) (1991, amended 2002, Addendum A). Governmental 
employees are immune from suit in such a circumstance, unless the plaintiff alleges 
specific facts supporting a claim of fraud or malice, which plaintiffs have not done 
here. See, e ^ , Brown v. Wanlass, 2001 UT App. 30, f7, 18 P.3d 1137, 1139 (action 
against government employee is barred because no evidence in record that employee 
acted with fraud or malice). 
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become "legally obligated to pay" anything as a result of the Hepworth matter, and the 
American Casualty Policy never could have been triggered. 
In fact, except in certain limited circumstances not present here, Nurse Broka 
would have been entitled to a defense and absolute indemnification from the 
University even if a claim had been made directly against him by the Hepworths. Id. 
at § 63-30-36 (1991, amended 2002) (governmental entity "shall defend any action 
brought against its employee arising from an act or omission occurring during the 
performance of the employee's duties, within the scope of the employee's 
employment, or under color of authority"), § 63-30-37 (1987) (if employee pays a 
judgment entered against him, the entity must indemnify him and reimburse him for 
defense costs). 
Similarly, the Act prohibits the University from attempting to obtain indemnity 
from Nurse Broka for its settlement with the Hepworths, even though - according to 
the University - his alleged negligence gave rise to the claim against the University. 
Section 63-30-38 provides that "[i]f a governmental entity pays all or part of a 
judgment based on or a compromise or settlement of a claim against the governmental 
entity or an employee, the employee may not be required to indemnify the 
governmental entity for the payment." (Emphasis added). 
Based on the Act and the facts of this case, the sole obligation to pay any 
settlement or judgment that arose out of Nurse Broka's alleged negligence in the 
course and scope of his employment with the University in connection with the 
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Hepworth matter rests with the University. The settlement agreement that the 
University entered into with the Hepworths settled all matters against the University 
and its "agents, servants . . . and all other persons, firms, corporations, associations or 
partnerships...[for claims] resulting from medical care and treatment rendered to Abel 
Hepworth at the University Hospital," a release broad enough to include Nurse Broka, 
an agent of the University, who presumably was only one of several University 
employees who provided medical care and treatment to Mr. Hepworth and/or who 
potentially were responsible for the alleged excess administration of fluids and any 
surrounding events that may have contributed to Mr. Hepworth's death. Such other 
individuals likely included, for example, the attending physician, the chief resident 
who wrote the orders regarding administration of the fluids, the charge nurse and the 
University's nursing educational staff who provided training to Nurse Broka, among 
others. In entering into the Hepworth settlement to protect the University's employees 
from personal liability for their alleged negligence, the University did no more than it 
was statutorily obligated to do. 
Because under the facts of this case Utah law statutorily immunizes Nurse 
Broka from having to contribute to the University's settlement with the Hepworths, it 
sensibly follows that he could not have become "legally obligated to pay" any amounts 
to them or to reimburse the University for its payment of the settlement. It also 
logically follows that American Casualty's indemnity obligations to Nurse Broka 
never matured, because the American Casualty Policy provides coverage only for 
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amounts that Nurse Broka becomes "legally obligated" to pay as damages based on his 
negligence - a situation that did not arise and never could have arisen on the facts of 
this case. 
2. The University Cannot Transfer Its Obligations Under The 
Act To Its Employees' Insurers 
The Utah Supreme Court, in interpreting an earlier version of the Act, and 
courts in other jurisdictions interpreting similar immunity statutes have held that where 
a government employee is immune from liability, not only is there no recourse against 
the employee, but there also is no recourse against his personal insurer. 
The Utah Supreme Court addressed this issue in Gulf Ins. Co. v. Horace Mann 
Ins. Co., 567 P.2d 158 (Utah 1977) under an earlier but analogous version of the Act.14 
In Gulf, a student sued a teacher for an injury sustained in a shop class. The teacher 
demanded that the school district indemnify him, pursuant to the Utah Public 
14
 Gulf was decided under the Utah Public Employees Indemnification Act, § 63-
48-1 (1953). As stated by the Court in Gull "Sec. 63-48-1, U.C.A.1953, provides that 
public entities (which includes school districts), shall' . . . protect (their) officers and 
employees from personal liability arising from acts or omissions committed during the 
performance of their duties, within the scope of their employment. . . .'" Id. at 159, 
n.l. The Court also quoted Sec. 63-48-5, U.C.A.1953: "(1) Except as provided in 
subsection (2) of this section, if a public entity pays all or part of any judgment based 
on or a compromise or settlement of the claim against itself or an officer or employee, 
the officer or employee is not liable to indemnify the public entity for this payment. (2) 
If the public entity pays all or part of any judgment based on a claim against itself or 
an officer or employee, the public entity may recover the amount of such payment if it 
is established that the officer or employee acted or failed to act due to gross 
negligence, fraud, or malice." Id. at 160, n.2. The relevant language from the version 
of the Act applied in Gulf and the version in effect at the time the University sought 
indemnification from Nurse Broka's insurer are substantially similar for purposes of 
the analysis here. 
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Employees' Indemnification Act, an earlier version of the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act. The school district referred the matter to its insurer, Gulf, which in 
turn demanded that Horace Mann - which had issued a group policy to the teacher 
through the Utah Education Association - defend the suit or participate in the defense. 
Horace Mann refused, claiming that the primary responsibility rested with the school 
district and, by implication, its insurer Gulf, and that Horace Mann only had secondary 
liability for any loss not covered by Gulf. 
Gulf argued that despite the statutory immunity protection afforded to the 
teacher, the teacher's insurer still should be required to participate. The Utah Supreme 
Court disagreed, reasoning that each of the insurers should be regarded as standing in 
the shoes of its own insured and as having the same rights and liabilities as its insured. 
Because the school district was statutorily obligated to defend and indemnify the 
teacher and was precluded from seeking any form of reimbursement or indemnity from 
the teacher, the Court held that the district's insurer likewise had no ability to shift any 
portion of the loss to the teacher's personal insurer. "[The statute].. .manifests] a 
clear legislative intent that it is the school district and not the employee who must bear 
any such a loss." Id. at 160. According to the court, the teacher's insurance was 
excess over the insurance provided by Gulf, or would provide insurance for matters 
excepted by the statute (i.e., if the employee acted with fraud or malice). Id. 
American Casualty's position here is even stronger than Horace Mann's 
position in the Gulf case. In Gulf, the teacher actually was named as a defendant in 
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the underlying suit; here, no formal "claim" as defined by the American Casualty 
Policy was ever made by the Hepworths specifically against Nurse Broka. 
Government employees in Utah are afforded absolute statutory immunity - with a few 
exceptions not applicable here - for acts or omissions occurring during the 
performance of their duties and within the scope of their employment. As Gulf makes 
clear, that protection effectively extends to the employee's insurer as well. 
Other jurisdictions addressing immunity provisions analogous to the Act have 
come to the same conclusion. For example, in Pacific Indemnity Co. v. American 
Mutual Insurance Co., 105 Cal. Rptr. 295 (Cal. App. 1972), Pacific Indemnity insured 
the Regents of the University of California and its employees. American Mutual was 
the private insurer of a physician employed by the Regents. Both the Regents and the 
physician were sued in a malpractice action and Pacific Indemnity defended and 
settled the action on behalf of the Regents and the physician. Pacific Indemnity 
thereafter sued the physician's insurer, American Mutual, for contribution. American 
Mutual contended - and the Court of Appeal agreed - that provisions of the California 
Government Code required the Regents to defend and indemnify its employees for 
actions arising in the course and scope of employment. Accordingly, the Court held 
that as the Regents' insurer, Pacific Indemnity was solely responsible for the loss 
"because any attempt by the Regents to secure contribution from its employee or his 
personal insurer would violate the legislative policy which gave rise to the provisions 
[of the Government Code involving defense and indemnification of public 
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employees]." Id. at 992 (emphasis added). As the court in Pacific Indemnity stated, 
"there is no good reason why the employer's insurer should benefit from the prudence 
of the public employee in providing himself with liability insurance which would 
cover his acts or omissions which were not within the scope of his employment." Id. 
Of similar import are United Pacific/Reliance Insurance Co. v Horace Mann 
Insurance Co., 670 P.2d 172, 175-176 (Or. Ct. App. 1983) (no apportionment among 
school district and teacher's insurers because only school district was ultimately liable 
for teacher's negligence as long as teacher was executing his job responsibilities; 
employer's insurer should not benefit from the prudence of the public employee in 
providing himself with additional liability insurance); St. Paul Ins. Cos. v. Horace 
Mann Ins. Co., 231 N.W.2d 619, 625 (Iowa 1975) (St. Paul, as insurer of school 
district and its teacher, is not entitled to contribution from Horace Mann, insurer of the 
teacher; "[o]ne who must indemnify another cannot at the same time claim 
contribution from that person") (cited with approval by Utah Supreme Court in Gulf); 
Bridewell v. Board of Education. 276 N.E.2d 745, 750 (111. App. 1971) (regardless of 
whether public employee has personal insurance, he is entitled to full indemnification 
from his employer) (cited with approval by Utah Supreme Court in Gulf). 
Here, the University's efforts to recover against American Casualty where it 
would not be entitled to recover against Nurse Broka would serve as little more than 
an attempted end-run around the protections afforded by the Act. Sanctioning those 
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efforts would seriously undermine the protections of the Act as well as the Utah 
Legislature's intent to provide broad immunity to Utah government employees. 
3, Coverage Under the American Casualty Policy Is Not Illusory 
The University asserts that applying the protections of the Act to this case 
would render American Casualty's coverage to Nurse Broka illusory for the brief 
period that he was employed as a Utah State employee. The University's argument is 
flawed for two reasons. 
First, in Gulf, the Utah Supreme Court concluded that the question of what 
coverage would be available under a personal liability policy issued to a government 
employee in light of the application of governmental immunity was irrelevant: 
What protection the school teachers may or may not 
receive from defendant Horace Mann is not material here. 
But, if may be of interest to observe that the latter's policy 
does cover excess over that insured by plaintiff Gulf and 
perhaps other matters excepted by the statute. 
Gulf, 567 P.2d at 160. 
Second, the University's argument ignores that Nurse Broka was a state 
employee for only four months while he was insured by American Casualty, [R. 299 at 
Tf 2, Addendum G], and that there were numerous instances in which the American 
Casualty Policy would provide coverage to Nurse Broka while he was a University 
employee. As noted above, as a state employee, Nurse Broka was immune for his 
negligent conduct in the course and scope of his employment. However, the American 
Casualty Policy provided coverage even in instances where he was not statutorily 
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immune. For example, if Nurse Broka had provided freelance home health care 
assistance, or if he had provided nursing care to family members, friends or neighbors, 
or if he had provided "good Samaritan" assistance to a stranger, he would have been 
covered under the American Casualty Policy, assuming he complied with the notice 
and other provisions of the Policy. The University also overlooks that in addition to 
professional liability coverage, the American Casualty Policy provided assault 
coverage and personal liability coverage for non-business activities [see R. 277-280 at 
§ I, Addendum E], all of which were valuable coverages unaffected by Nurse Broka's 
status as a University employee. 
The cases on which the University relies in an attempt to demonstrate that 
American Casualty's coverage is somehow illusory are neither controlling nor, more 
importantly, are they similar to the case at bar. In Monticello Insurance Co. v. Mike's 
Speedway Lounge, Inc., 949 F. Supp. 694 (S.D. Ind. 1996), an insurer issued a general 
liability policy to a bar that contained an "absolute alcohol" exclusion. The bar, which 
by its very nature was in the business of serving alcohol, successfully argued that the 
exclusion rendered the policy's coverage illusory because virtually any claim against 
the bar would be "connected with" the business of serving alcohol. Id. at 700-701. 
Unlike Monticello, this case does not present an analogous situation in which 
American Casualty, for example, issued a nursing policy to Nurse Broka that 
contained a "nursing exclusion." 
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Similarly inapposite is Meyer v. Classified Insurance Co., 531 N.W.2d 416 
(Wis. Ct. App. 1995), in which the insurer issued an underinsured motorists ("UIM"") 
policy that purported to provide UIM coverage in the amount of $25,000 that was 
triggered only in the event that the other driver's liability coverage was less than 
$25,000. The court noted that in Wisconsin, however, the statutory minimum for 
liability was $25,000, so enforcing the policy as written would mean that there never 
would be a situation where the insurer would be obligated to pay a UIM claim, which 
violated Wisconsin public policy. Id. at 418. Unlike Meyer, the fact that the 
University's settlement with the Hepworths is not covered by the American Casualty 
Policy does not mean there never could have been coverage under American 
Casualty's Policy under any circumstance. 
C. AMERICAN CASUALTY HAS NOT WAIVED ITS COVERAGE 
DEFENSES. 
Finally, the University asserts that American Casualty somehow has waived its 
ability to rely on the American Casualty Policy's insuring agreement, or to raise the 
Act as a defense in this litigation. The University's waiver argument is misguided. 
The requirements for waiver simply aire not met here. "Waiver is the 
intentional relinquishment of a known right. To waive a right, there must be . . . an 
intention to relinquish it. The party's actions or conduct must unequivocally evince an 
intent to waive or must at least be inconsistent with any other intent." Clarke v. 
American Concept Ins. Co., 758 P.2d 470, 473 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (emphasis added; 
citations omitted) (insurer did not waive its right to disclaim coverage based on 
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premium mailed after due date). There is no competent, admissible evidence that 
American Casualty unequivocally intended to waive its right to disclaim coverage on 
any ground. 
To support its waiver argument, the University points to American Casualty's 
July 17, 1997 letter [Addendum F] in which it declined to participate in the Hepworth 
settlement. The University evidently has misunderstood American Casualty's letter, 
and suggests that American Casualty did not actually deny coverage but instead said 
that its Policy provided only excess coverage. See University's Brief at p. 16. To the 
contrary, American Casualty's July 17, 1997 expressly advised the University that it 
was declining to participate in settlement discussions concerning the Hepworth matter 
because the University, as Nurse Broka's employer, should be primarily responsible to 
provide coverage for his conduct. The letter also advised that "we would be 
considered an excess carrier at best" [R. 291, Addendum F, emphasis added]. 
Any doubt about whether the University was fully aware that American 
Casualty denied coverage is put to rest by the affidavit of Lynda Faldmo, the 
University's risk manager. She attested that "[although the University invited 
American Casualty Company of Reading, Pennsylvania to participate in settlement 
negotiations with Mrs. Hepworth, it refused to participate or to provide coverage to 
Nurse Broka" [R. 110 at f^ 8; emphasis added, Addendum D]. 
The University nonetheless contends that it has been prejudiced, because had it 
known that American Casualty was going to insist that there be a "claim" against 
-41-
Nurse Broka as a prerequisite to coverage, it easily could have remedied "the technical 
deficiency" by asking Mrs. Hepworth to make a demand on him. See University's 
Brief at 16-17. Again, the University misses the point. As noted above, the indemnity 
issue in this case hinges on whether Nurse Broka incurred a legal obligation to pay 
damages to the Hepworth's because of his negligence, not on whether a "claim" was 
made against him. 
There is no evidence in the record to support the University's prejudice 
argument. And, contrary to the University's speculation about what it might have 
done to manufacture a "claim," there is nothing that it could have done in this case to 
trigger American Casualty's indemnity obligation, because of the protections afforded 
Nurse Broka under the Act. It could not change the fact that Nurse Broka never 
incurred a legal obligation to pay damages to the Hepworths; it could not change the 
fact that as a University employee, Nurse Broka was statutorily immune from personal 
liability to the Hepworths and that the University was statutorily obligated to defend 
and indemnify him; and it could not change the holding of the Utah Supreme Court in 
Gulf, which essentially prohibits government entities from attempting to foist their 
liabilities onto their employees'personal insurers. 
As further support for its waiver argument, the University cites to a Utah 
administrative regulation (§ 590-190-10(2)) requiring that insurers cite to a "specific 
provision, condition or exclusion" in their policies when denying coverage. According 
to the University, American Casualty's failure to cite the "legally obligated to pay" 
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language of the insuring agreement when it denied coverage waived American 
Casualty's ability to rely on that language here. However, the language contained in 
the American Casualty Policy's insuring agreement is an affirmative element of the 
University's claim to coverage. Under Utah law, the insured bears the initial burden of 
proving that a claim has been made and comes within the scope of the policy's 
insuring agreement. See LPS Hosp. v. Capitol Life Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 
1988) (burden of proving that claim falls within insuring agreement rests with 
insured). As Nurse Broka's putative subrogee, it is the University's burden to prove 
that the coverage agreement is triggered, i.e., that Nurse Broka became legally 
obligated to pay some amount. As discussed above, the University failed to do so. 
To the extent that the University likewise argues that the same administrative 
regulation required American Casualty to also advise of its intent to rely on the Act, 
American Casualty notes that the Act is not a "provision, condition, or exclusion" of 
its Policy. See Utah Admin. Reg. § 590-190-10(2).15 Moreover, the protections 
afforded by the Act are not American Casualty's to waive, and the University has 
made no showing whatsoever that Nurse Broka ever waived his right to statutory 
immunity or that such rights are even capable of being waived. 
The Utah unfair claims settlement practices rules cannot be used to create 
liability in any event. See Cannon v. Travelers Indem. Co., 2000 UT App. 10, ^  22-
24, 994 P.2d 824, 828 (unfair claims settlement practices rules do not create a private 
right of action against insurer). 
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There is nothing unfair or inequitable about leaving the underlying liability 
where it lies, with the University. American Casualty did not mislead the University 
into believing that it would participate in the settlement, only to surprise the University 
later by declining to do so. American Casualty declined to participate from the very 
beginning. In analogous situations, the majority of jurisdictions have correctly held 
that where an insurer denies coverage at the outset - as American Casualty did here -
it has not waived its ability to rely on policy provisions that were not mentioned in the 
initial denial. These cases are based on the sound rationale that a policy's coverage 
cannot be expanded to provide coverage that the insured did not purchase. See, e.g., 
Greenberg & Covitz v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 711 A.2d 909, 
915 (N.J. Ct. App. 1998) (professional liability insurer did not waive exclusion by 
failing to mention it in disclaimer letter; coverage could not be enlarged by waiver); 
Waller v. Truck Ins. Exh., Inc., 900 P.2d 619, 636 (Cal. 1995) (insurer did not 
impliedly waive coverage defenses that it failed to mention when it denied claim, 
where denial letter did not indicate intention to relinquish additional reasons for denial; 
noting that "of the 33 sister states to consider the issue, 32 agree"); Consolidated Rail 
Corp. v. Hartford Ace. & Indem. Co., 676 F. Supp. 82, 85 (E.D. Pa. 1987) ("waiver 
cannot operate to expand coverage under an insurance policy"). The University -
which is not even American Casualty's insured - simply cannot create coverage where 
it otherwise does not exist. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Here, the only equitable result would be for this Court to leave the liability for 
the Hepworth settlement where it properly lies - with the University. In settling the 
Hepworths' claim, the University did not assume any greater an obligation than it 
otherwise had. The University's settlement with the Hepworths bought peace for the 
University and all of its employees, for which the University is statutorily and solely 
liable. Any determination to the contrary would re-write the American Casualty 
Policy and permit the University to effectively escape its obligations under the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act. For all the foregoing reasons, American Casualty 
respectfully requests that the judgment of the District Court be affirmed. 
Dated: July 31, 2003 Respectfully Submitted, 
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ADDENDUM A 
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*** STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 2002 6TH SPECIAL SESSION *** 
*** ANNOTATIONS CURRENT THROUGH 2003 UT 1, 2003 UT APP 13*** 
*** AND JANUARY 17, 2003 (FEDERAL CASES) *** 
TITLE 63. STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL 
CHAPTER 30. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 
GO TO CODE ARCHIVE DIRECTORY FOR THIS JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3 (2003) 
STATUS: CONSULT SLIP LAWS CITED BELOW FOR RECENT CHANGES TO THIS DOCUMENT LEXSEE 
2003 Ut. ALS 3 - See section 5. 
§ 63-30-3. Immunity of governmental entities from suit 
(1) Except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter, all governmental entities are immune from suit for any injury 
which results from the exercise of a governmental function, governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home, or other 
governmental health care facility, and from an approved medical, nursing, or other professional health care clinical 
training program conducted in either public or private facilities. 
(2) (a) For the purposes of this chapter only, the following state medical programs and services performed at a 
state-owned university hospital are unique or essential to the core of governmental activity in this state and are 
considered to be governmental functions: 
(i) care of a patient referred by another hospital or physician because of the high risk nature of the patient's 
medical condition; 
(ii) high risk care or procedures available in Utah only at a state-owned university hospital or provided in Utah 
only by physicians employed at a state-owned university acting in the scope of their employment; 
(iii)care of patients who cannot receive appropriate medical care or treatment at another medical facility in 
Utah; and 
(iv) any other service or procedure performed at a state-owned university hospital or by physicians employed at 
a state-owned university acting in the scope of their employment that a court finds is unique or essential to the core of 
governmental activity in this state. 
(b) If any claim under this subsection exceeds the limits established in Section 63-30-34, the claimant may submit 
the excess claim to the Board of Examiners and the Legislature under Title 63, Chapter 6. 
(3) The management of flood waters and other natural disasters and the construction, repair, and operation of flood 
and storm systems by governmental entities are considered to be governmental functions, and governmental entities and 
their officers and employees are immune from suit for any injury or damage resulting from those activities. 
(4) Officers and employees of a Children's Justice Center are immune from suit for any injury which results from 
their joint intergovernmental functions at a center created in Title 62A, Chapter 4a. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3 
Page 2 
HISTORY: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 3; 1978, ch. 27, § 2; 1981, ch. 116, § 2; 1984, ch. 33, § 1; 1985, ch. 93, § 1; 1991, ch. 
15, § 1; 1991, ch. 248, § 7. 
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UTAH 2003 SESSION LAWS 
55th LEGISLATURE, 2003 GENERAL SESSION 
Copr. © West Group 2003. All rights reserved. 
Additions are indicated by | S | ; deletions by 
Text. Changes in tables are made but not highlighted. 
Ch. 3 (H.B. 160) 
WEST'S NO. 325 
EMERGENCY HEALTH RESPONSE AMENDMENTS 
This act amends professional licensing provisions, the powers and duties of local 
health departments, and provisions related to immunity from liability for 
governmental entities and certain professionals. The act establishes exceptions to 
certain licensing standards when a national, state, or local emergency is declared. 
The act amends certain prescription drug dispensing rules when emergencies are 
declared. The act authorizes local departments of health to investigate suspected 
bioterrorism and diseases and to provide public health assistance in a declared 
emergency. The act provides limited immunity from civil damages for governmental 
entities and certain health professionals responding to a declared emergency. This 
act has an immediate effective date. 
This act affects sections of Utah Code Annotated 1953 as follows: 
AMENDS: 
26A-1-114, as last amended by Chapter 249, Laws of Utah 2002 
58-1-307, as last amended by Chapter 63, Laws of Utah 2001 
58-13-2, as last amended by Chapter 160, Laws of Utah 2000 
58-17a-620, as enacted by Chapter 247, Laws of Utah 1996 
63-30-3, as last amended by Chapters 15 and 248, Laws of Utah 1991 
78-11-22, as last amended by Chapter 211, Laws of Utah 1987 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah: 
• * * 
Section 5. Section 63-30-3 is amended to read: 
Copr. © West 2003 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
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« UT ST § 63-30-3 » 
§ 63-30-3. Immunity of governmental entities from suit. 
(1) Except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter, all governmental entities 
are immune from suit for any injury which results from the exercise of a 
governmental function, governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home, or other 
governmental health care facility, and from an approved medical, nursing, or other 
professional health care clinical training program conducted in either public or 
private facilities. 
+^H|51(a) For the purposes of this chapter only, the following state medical 
programs and services performed at a state-owned university hospital are unique or 
essential to the core of governmental activity in this state and are considered to 
be governmental functions: 
(I) care of a patient referred by another hospital or physician because of the 
high risk nature of the patientfs medical condition; 
(n) high risk care or procedures available in Utah only at a state-owned 
university hospital or provided in Utah only by physicians employed at a state-
owned university acting in the scope of their employment; 
( m ) care of patients who cannot receive appropriate medical care or treatment at 
another medical facility in Utah; and 
(IV) any other service or procedure performed at a state-owned university hospital 
or by physicians employed at a state-owned university acting in the scope of their 
employment that a court finds is unique or essential to the core of governmental 
activity in this state. 
(b) If any claim under this Subsection j§f|f exceeds the limits established in 
Section 63-30-34, the claimant may submit the excess claim to the Board of 
Examiners and the Legislature under Title 63, Chapter 6. 
-f3-Hfifii T n e management of flood waters and other natural disasters and the 
Copr © West 2003 No Clam to Ong U S Govt Works 
UTLEGIS3(2003) 
2003 Utah Laws Ch. 3 (H.B. 160) 
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construction, repair, and operation of flood and storm systems by governmental 
entities are considered to be governmental functions, and governmental entities and 
their officers and employees are immune from suit for any injury or damage 
resulting from those activities. 
Officers and employees of a Children's Justice Center are immune from suit 
for any injury which results from their joint intergovernmental functions at a 
center created in Title 62A, Chapter 4a| 
Section 7. Effective date. 
#H 
S££M 
Effective February 18, 2003. 
Approved February 18, 2003. 
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UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 63, STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL 
CHAPTER 30. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 
Copyright © 2002 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the 
LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. 
Current through the 2002 5th Special Session 
63-30-4 Act provisions not construed as admission or denial of liability — Effect 
of waiver of immunity —Exclusive remedy ---Joinder of employee -- Limitations on 
personal liability. 
(1) (a) Nothing contained in this chapter, unless specifically provided, may be 
construed as an admission or denial of liability or responsibility by or for 
governmental entities or their employees. 
(b) If immunity from suit is waived by this chapter, consent to be sued is 
granted, and liability of the entity shall be determined as if the entity were a 
private person. 
(c) No cause of action or basis of liability is created by any waiver of 
immunity in this chapter, nor may any provision of this chapter be construed as 
imposing strict liability or absolute liability. 
(2) Nothing in this chapter may be construed as adversely affecting any immunity 
from suit that a governmental entity or employee may otherwise assert under state 
or federal law. 
(3) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (3)(b), an action under this chapter 
against a governmental entity or its employee for an injury caused by an act or 
omission that occurs during the performance of the employee's duties, within the 
scope of employment, or under color of authority is a plaintiff's exclusive remedy. 
(b) A plaintiff may not bring or pursue any other civil action or proceeding 
based upon the same subject matter against the employee or the estate of the 
employee whose act or omission gave rise to the claim, unless: 
(i) the employee acted or failed to act through fraud or malice; 
(ii) the injury or damage resulted from the conditions set forth in 
Subsection 63-30-36(3)(c); or 
(iii) in a judicial or administrative proceeding the employee intentionally 
or knowingly gave, upon a lawful oath or in any form allowed by law as a substitute 
for an oath, false testimony material to the issue or matter of inquiry under this 
section. 
(4) An employee may be joined in an action against a governmental entity in a 
representative capacity if the act or omission complained of is one for which the 
governmental entity may be liable, but no employee may be held personally liable 
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for acts or omissions occurring during the performance of the employee's duties, 
within the scope of employment, or under color of authority, unless it is 
established that: 
(a) the employee acted or failed to act due to fraud or malice; 
(b) the injury or damage resulted from the conditions set forth in Subsection 
63-30-36(3)(c)/ or 
(c) in a judicial or administrative proceeding the employee intentionally or 
knowingly gave, upon a lawful oath or in any form allowed by law as a substitute 
for an oath, false testimony material to the issue or matter of inquiry under this 
section. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 4; 1978, ch. 27, § 3; 1983, ch. 129, § 3; 1991, ch. 
76, § 1; 2002, ch. 206, § 2. 
Amendment Notes. — T h e 2002 amendment, effective May 6, 2002, added Subsection 
(3)(b)(iii), added subsection designations in Subsection (4), added Subsections 
(4)(b) and (c), and made related changes. 
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TITLE 63. STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL 
CHAPTER 30. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 
GO TO CODE ARCHIVE DIRECTORY FOR THIS JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-28 (2003) 
§ 63-30-28. Liability insurance — Purchase of insurance or self-insurance by governmental entity authorized — 
Establishment of trust accounts for self-insurance 
(l)Any governmental entity within the state may purchase commercial insurance, self-insure, or self-insure and 
purchase excess commercial insurance in excess of the statutory limits of this chapter against any risk created or 
recognized by this chapter or any action for which a governmental entity or its employee may be held liable. 
(2) (a) In addition to any other reasonable means of self-insurance, a governmental entity may self-insure with 
respect to specified classes of claims by establishing a trust account under the management of an independent private 
trustee having authority with respect to claims of that character to expend both principal and earnings of the trust 
account solely to pay the costs of investigation, discovery, and other pretrial and litigation expenses including attorneys' 
fees, and to pay all sums for which the governmental entity may be adjudged liable or for which a compromise 
settlement may be agreed upon. 
(b) The monies and interest earned on said trust fund shall be subject to investment pursuant to Title 51, Chapter 
7, State Money Management Act of 1974, and shall be subject to audit by the state auditor. 
(3) Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, the trust agreement between the governmental entity and the trustee 
may authorize the trustee to employ counsel to defend actions against the entity and its employees and to protect and 
safeguard the assets of the trust, to provide for claims investigation and adjustment services, to employ expert witnesses 
and consultants, and to provide such other services and functions necessary and proper to carry out the purposes of the 
trust. 
HISTORY: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 28; 1978, ch. 27, § 9; 1979, ch. 94, § 1; 1983, ch. 130, § 1; 1985, ch. 21, § 32; 1991, 
ch. 203, § 5. 
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UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 63. STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL 
CHAPTER 30. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 
Copyright © 2002 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the 
LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. 
Current through the 2002 5th Special Session 
63-30-36 Defending government employee —Request —Cooperation —Payment of 
judgment. 
(1) Except as provided in Subsections (2) and (3), a governmental entity shall 
defend any action brought against its employee arising from an act or omission 
occurring: 
(a) during the performance of the employee's duties; 
(b) within the scope of the employee's employment; or 
(c) under color of authority. 
(2) (a) Before a governmental entity may defend its employee against a claim, the 
employee shall make a written request to the governmental entity to defend him: 
(i) within ten days after service of process upon him; or 
(ii) within a longer period that would not prejudice the governmental entity 
in maintaining a defense on his behalf; or 
(iii) within a period that would not conflict with notice requirements 
imposed on the entity in connection with insurance carried by the entity relating 
to the risk involved. 
(b) If the employee fails to make a request, or fails to reasonably cooperate 
in the defense, the governmental entity need not defend or continue to defend the 
employee, nor pay any judgment, compromise, or settlement against the employee in 
respect to the claim. 
(3) The governmental entity may decline to defend, or subject to any court rule 
or order, decline to continue to defend, an action against an employee if it 
determines: 
(a) that the act or omission in question did not occur: 
(i) during the performance of the employee's duties; 
(ii) within the scope of his employment; or 
(iii) under color of authority; 
(b) that the injury or damage resulted from the fraud or malice of the 
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employee; or 
(c) that the injury or damage on which the claim was based resulted from: 
(i) the employee driving a vehicle, or being in actual physical control of a 
vehicle: 
(A) with a blood alcohol content equal to or greater by weight than the 
established legal limit; 
(B) while under the influence of alcohol or any drug to a degree that 
rendered the person incapable of safely driving the vehicle; or 
(C) while under the combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree 
that rendered the person incapable of safely driving the vehicle; or 
(ii) the employee being physically or mentally impaired so as to be unable to 
reasonably perform his job function because of the use of alcohol, because of the 
nonprescribed use of a controlled substance as defined in Section 58-37-4, or 
because of the combined influence of alcohol and a nonprescribed controlled 
substance as defined by Section 58- 37-4; or 
(d) that in a judicial or administrative proceeding the employee intentionally 
or knowingly gave, upon a lawful oath or in any form allowed by law as a substitute 
for an oath, false testimony to the issue or matter of inquiry under this section. 
(4) (a) Within ten days of receiving a written request to defend an employee, the 
governmental entity shall inform the employee whether or not it shall provide a 
defense, and, if it refuses to provide a defense, the basis for its refusal. 
(b) A refusal by the entity to provide a defense is not admissible for any 
purpose in the action in which the employee is a defendant. 
(5) Except as provided in Subsection (6), if a governmental entity conducts the 
defense of an employee, the governmental entity shall pay any judgment based upon 
the claim. 
\ 
(6) A governmental entity may conduct the defense of an employee under a 
reservation of rights under which the governmental entity reserves the right not to 
pay a judgment, if the conditions set forth in Subsection (3) are established. 
(7) (a) Nothing in this section or Section 63-30-37 affects the obligation of a 
governmental entity to provide insurance coverage according to the requirements of 
Subsection 41-12a-301(3) and Section 63-30-29.5. 
(b) When -a governmental entity declines to defend, or declines to continue to 
defend, an action against its employee under the conditions set forth in Subsection 
(3), it shall still provide coverage up to the amount specified in Sections 31A-22-
304 and 63-30-29.5. 
History: C. 1953, 63-30-36, enacted by L. 1983, ch. 131, § 4; 1987, ch. 30, § 1; 
1991, ch. 76, § 9; 2002, ch. 206, § 3. 
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Amendment Notes. —The 2002 amendment, effective May 6, 2002, added Subsection 
(3) (d) . 
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TITLE 63. STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL 
CHAPTER 30. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 
GO TO CODE ARCHIVE DIRECTORY FOR THIS JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-37 (2003) 
§ 63-30-37. Recovery of judgment paid and defense costs by government employee 
(1) Subject to Subsection (2), if an employee pays a judgment entered against him, or any portion of it, which the 
governmental entity is required to pay under Section 63-30-36, the employee may recover from the governmental entity 
the amount of the payment and the reasonable costs incurred in his defense. 
(2) If a governmental entity does not conduct the defense of an employee against a claim, or conducts the defense 
under an agreement as provided in Subsection 63-30-36(6), the employee may recover from the governmental entity 
under Subsection (1) if: 
(a) the employee establishes that the act or omission upon which the judgment is based occurred during the 
performance of his duties, within the scope of his employment, or under color of authority, and that he conducted the 
defense in good faith; and 
(b) the governmental entity does not establish that the injury or damage resulted from: 
(i) the fraud or malice of the employee; 
(ii) the employee driving a vehicle, or being in actual physical control of a vehicle: 
(A) with a blood alcohol content equal to or greater by weight than the established legal limit; 
(B) while under the influence of alcohol or any drag to a degree that rendered the person incapable of safely 
driving the vehicle; 
(C) while under the combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree that rendered the person 
incapable of safely driving the vehicle; or 
(iii) the employee being physically or mentally impaired so as to be unable to reasonably perform his job 
function because of the use of alcohol, because of the nonprescribed use of a controlled substance as defined in Section 
58-37-4, or because of the combined use of alcohol and a nonprescribed controlled substance as defined in Section 58-
37-4. 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 63-30-37, enacted by L. 1983, ch. 131, § 5; 1987, ch. 30, § 2. 
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TITLE 63. STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL 
CHAPTER 30. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 
GO TO CODE ARCHIVE DIRECTORY FOR THIS JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-38 (2003) 
§ 63-30-38. Indemnification of governmental entity by employee not required 
If a governmental entity pays all or part of a judgment based on or a compromise or settlement of a claim against the 
governmental entity or an employee, the employee may not be required to indemnify the governmental entity for the 
payment. 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 63-30-38, enacted by L. 1983, ch. 131, § 6. 
ADDENDUM B 
Complaint filed by University of Utah Hospital and University of Utah against 
American Casualty (erroneously sued as Continental Casualty) 
DAVID G. WILLIAMS (A3481) 
TERENCE L. ROONEY (A5789) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801)521-9000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH HOSPITAL 
AND UNIVERSITY OF UTAH, COMPLAINT 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CONTINENTAL CASUALTY dba CNA 
INSURANCE COMPANIES, an Illinois 
corporation, 
Defendant. 
Plaintiff complains of Defendant as follows: 
PARTIES AND JURISDICTION 
1. Plaintiffs University of Utah Hospital and University of Utah (hereinafter "the 
University") are located in Salt Lake County, Utah, and are agencies of the State of Utah. 
FILM DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
DEC 2 31998 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
By . 
Deputy Clerk 
civi,No. qOQC\ J 3 I 5 0 
Judge
 :TVAM S A t t 
2. Defendant Continental Casualty dba CNA Insurance Companies (hereinafter 
"CNA") is an Illinois corporation registered to do business, and doing business, as an insurance 
company in the State of Utah. 
3. Venue and jurisdiction are proper pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 78-13-4 and 
Section 31A-1-105. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
4. At all relevant times, CNA provided nursing professional liability insurance to 
Nurse Troy Alan Broka (hereinafter "Nurse Broka"), issued through American Casualty 
Company, which was in effect at all times material to this claim. 
5. A copy of Nurse Broka's aforementioned professional liability policy with CNA 
is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by this reference. 
6. Nurse Broka's professional liability coverage provided limits of liability, in the 
event of a claim arising from the rendering of professional nursing services by Nurse Broka, in 
the amounts of $1,000,000 for each medical incident and $3,000,000 aggregate. 
7. Nurse Broka's CNA policy provided professional liability coverage to him for, 
among other things, injury or damages caused by a medical incident arising out of care provided 
by Nurse Broka. 
8. During April of 1997, Nurse Broka was employed by the University, working as 
a travel nurse at the University Hospital. 
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9. While working in the Hospital, Nurse Broka provided nursing care to Abel 
Hepworth, who was admitted on April 10, 1997 for surgical repair of an aneurysm. 
10. In providing care to Mr. Hepworth, Nurse Broka negligently misread a physician's 
order for the infusion of IV fluids and infused Mr. Hepworth with an excessive amount of fluids; 
specifically NS with KCL at 500 cc. per hour instead of the 100 cc. per hour ordered by the 
physician. 
11. As a result of the fluid overload suffered by Mr. Hepworth from the incorrect 
administration of fluids, Mr. Hepworth died on April 14, 1997. 
12. Shortly following the death of Mr. Hepworth, the Hospital was informed by his 
wife, Susan Hepworth, acting individually and on behalf of the Hepworth minor children, Alex 
Hepworth and Ammon Hepworth, (hereinafter collectively referred to as "the Hepworths") that 
she intended to commence a lawsuit against the University based on the care provided to her 
husband by Nurse Broka; specifically, the excessive administration of fluids. 
13. Prior to commencing a lawsuit, Mrs. Hepworth initiated settlement negotiations 
with the University. 
14. On or about June 11, 1997, counsel for the University informed CNA of the 
aforementioned facts involving Nurse Broka and invited CNA's participation in the settlement 
negotiations with Mrs. Hepworth. 
15. By letter of July 17, 1997, CNA declined to participate in the settlement 
negotiations. 
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16. On or about July 10, 1997, counsel for the University tendered the defense and 
indemnification of Nurse Broka to CNA. Defendant did not respond. 
17. Because Nurse Broka was an agent of the University and because his negligence 
caused Mr. Hepworth's death, the Hepworths' claims were subsequently settled by the University 
with Mrs. Hep worth. 
18. In exchange for releasing her claims and the claims of her minor children against 
the University, the University and its excess insurance carrier, St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance 
Company, paid Mrs. Hepworth and her minor children in excess of $1,000,(XX). 
19. The University's only liability insurance applicable to the Hepworths' claims was 
an excess liability policy with St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Companies, under which the 
University had a $1,000,000 per occurrence self retention. Accordingly, the University was 
uninsured for the first $1,000,000 of the Hepworth's claims and the University paid $1,000,000 
in settlement proceeds and defense costs to settle the claims. 
20. The remainder of the setdement paid to the Hepworths, in excess of the $1,000,000 
paid by University, was paid by its excess insurance carrier, St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance 
Companies. 
21. The entire settlement paid to the Hepworths was paid as a result of and arising out 
of the care rendered by Nurse Broka. 
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FIRST CLAM FOR RELIEF 
(SUBROGATION-BREACH OF DUTY TO DEFEND) 
22. The University realleges and incorporates herein by this reference paragraphs 1 
through 21 inclusive 
23. By CNA's failure to participate in the setdement and failure to defend Nurse Broka 
against the aforementioned claims, CNA breached the duty arising under its policy to defend 
Nurse Broka. 
24. Because CNA breached its duty to defend Nurse Broka, the University of Utah paid 
such defense costs and is therefore subrogated and entitled to recover such defense costs, plus 
interest, from CNA. 
25. Accordingly, the University is entitled to judgment against CNA for the costs and 
attorneys' fees of negotiating and defending the Hepworths' claims against the University arising 
out of the care provided by Nurse Broka in the amount of $8,459.20 with interest thereon at the 
legal rate. 
SECOND CAUSE QF ACTION 
(EQUITABLE SUBROGATION) 
26. The University realleges and incorporates herein by this reference paragraphs 1 
through 25 inclusive. 
27. By CNA's failure to participate in the settlement and failure to defend Nurse Broka 
against the aforementioned claims, CNA failed to comply with its policy provisions requiring it 
-5-
to pay all amounts up to policy limits for which Nurse Broka became legally obligated to pay as 
a result of injuries caused by a medical incident arising from care provided by Nurse Broka. 
27. Because CNA breached its duty to pay the aforementioned settlement amounts, the 
University paid is subrogated to recover such amount, plus interest, from CNA. 
28. Accordingly, the University is entitled to judgment against CNA, with interest 
thereon at the legal rate. 
WHEREFORE, the University prays for judgment against Defendant as follows: 
1. Under its First Cause of Action, reimbursement of its defense costs in the amount 
of $8,459.20, together with interest thereon at the legal rate; 
2. Under its Second Cause of Action, for $1,000,000, together with interest thereon 
at the legal rate; and 
3. For its costs herein incurred and such other relief, including attorneys' fees, as the 
Court deems just and appropriate. 
DATED thi^7g^/7day of December, 1998. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Terence L/Rooney ' 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Plaintiffs' Address: 
50 North Medical Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84132 
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ADDENDUM C 
District Court's orders granting/jro hac vice admission of Alec M. Barinholtz and 
Jennifer Mathis 
JarylL. Rencher#4903 
EPPERSON & RENCHER 
Attorneys for Defendant American Casualty Company 
10 West 100 South, #500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: (801) 983-9800 
FILED DISTRICT C0UIT 
Third judicial District 
FEB - 6 2002 
JLAKE^OW ITY 
Deputy Clerk 
THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH HOSPITAL and 
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
CONTINENTAL CASUALTY dba CNA 
INSURANCE COMPANIES, an Illinois 
corporation, 
Defendant. 
ORDER ON MOTION AND 
CONSENT OF DESIGNATED 
ASSOCIATE LOCAL COUNSEL 
ST. PAUL FIRE AND MARINE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, a Minnesota 
Corporation 
Plaintiff, 
CONTINENTAL CASUALTY dba CNA 
INSURANCE COMPANIES, an Illinois 
Corporation, and TROY ALAN BROKA, 
Defendants. 
Civil No. 980913150 
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
The Court, having reviewed the Motion of Designated Associate Local Counsel, and based 
on the facts contained herein, and for good cause shown, hereby 
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES that Alec Barinholtz is hereby admitted pro hac 
vice to practice in this court. 
DATED this j&l day of February, 2002. 
BY THE COl 
15 
Jaryl L. Rencher #4903 
EPPERSON & RENCHER 
Attorneys for Defendant American Casualty Company 
10 West 100 South, #500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone. (801) 983-9800 
THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH HOSPITAL and 
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
CONTINENTAL CASUALTY dba CNA ; 
INSURANCE COMPANIES, an Illinois ; 
corporation, ] 
Defendant. ] 
ST. PAUL FIRE AND MARINE ; 
INSURANCE COMPANY, a Minnesota ; 
Corporation 
Plaintiff, ) 
V. ; 
CONTINENTAL CASUALTY dba CNA ; 
INSURANCE COMPANIES, an Illinois ) 
Corporation, and TROY ALAN BROKA, ) 
Defendants. ] 
) ORDER ON MOTION AND 
) CONSENT OF DESIGNATED 
) ASSOCIATE LOCAL COUNSEL 
) Civil No. 980913150 
» Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
The Court, having reviewed the Motion of Designated Associate Local Counsel, and based 
on the facts contained herein, and for good cause shown, hereby 
FILED DISTRICT C0UIT 
Third Judicial District 
EB - 6 2002 
LAKEV:OUNJY 
Deputy Cterk 
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES that Jennifer Mathis is hereby admitted pro hac 
vice to practice in this court. 
A 
DATED this £/_ day of February, 2002. 
BYTHECOl 
JUDGE GLENN K. IWASAKI 
ADDENDUM D 
Affidavit of Lynda Faldmo 
TERENCE L. ROONEY (A5789) 
JULIANNE P. BLANCH (A6495) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MAR7TNEAU 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
10 Exchange Place, Suite 1100 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5000 
Telephone: (801)521-9000 
Facsimile: (801) 363-0400 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH HOSPITAL and 
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH, 
Plaintiffs, AFFIDAVIT OF LYNDA FALDMO 
vs. 
AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY OF Case No. 980913150 CN 
READING, PA, 
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
Defendant. 
ST. PAUL FIRE AND MARINE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, a Minnesota 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY OF 
READING, PA, and TROY ALAN BROKA, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Lynda Faldmo, being duly sworn, state under oath as follows: 
1. This affidavit is based on my personal knowledge, and I am over 21 years of age. 
2. I am the Director of Risk Management for the University of Utah Hospital and 
have been so employed since September 1994. 
3* I am familiar with a claim asserted by Mrs. Susan Hepworth arising from the 
death of her husband Abel Hepworth at the University of Utah Hospital on April 14,1997. 
4. During April 1997, the University hired Troy Broka as a traveling nurse working 
at the University of Utah Hospital. 
5. Nurse Broka provided nursing care to Mr. Abel Hepworth, a University of Utah 
Hospital patient, who was admitted on April 10, 1997, for surgical repair of an aneurysm. In the 
course of providing care to Mr. Hepworth, Mrs. Hepworth contends that Nurse Broka misread a 
physician's order for the infusion of IV fluids and infused Mr. Hepworth with an excessive 
amount of fluids. She also maintains that her husband died as a result of Nurse Broka 
administering an excessive amount of fluids contrary to the physician's instructions. 
6. Shortly after Mr. Hepworth died, his wife informed the University of her intention 
to file a medical malpractice lawsuit arising out of the care rendered by Nurse Broka on her 
behalf and that of her minor children. She initiated settlement negotiations with the University 
before filing a lawsuit. 
2 
7. The University was self-insured for professional liability claims up to $1,000,000, 
meaning that it would pay judgments or settlements against it out of its pocket up to $1,000,000. 
This is set forth in the University of Utah Professional Liability Self-Insurance Trust Agreement. 
8. Although the University invited American Casualty Company of Reading, 
Pennsylvania to participate in settlement negotiations with Mrs. Hepworth, it refused to 
participate or to provide coverage to Nurse Broka. The University settled Mrs. Hepworth's claim 
in 1998 for over $1,000,000. The University paid $1,000,000 to Mrs. Hepworth and her two 
minor children from the self-insurance fund, and St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance paid the 
remainder. 
DATED this ZZ** day of February, 2002. 
ynaal 
y y ^ ^ - /^u/^cQ 
L d  Faldmo 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this >?l^day of February, 2002. 
My Commission Expires: 
f3o/aSK ill 
N:\9183\ltfPB\FALDMOAFF 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in the State of Utah 
/ f / j ^ S ^ \ * \ 1796 Meadowmoor Rd 
xX 1Rft£$lv)!)Sa,t L a k e c , l V ' u t a h 8 4 1 1 7 
\ V jtiH$J?f My Commission Expires 
XS— -^y APr,( 3°- 2 o ° 2 
ADDENDUM E 
American Casualty Policy issued to Nurse Troy Alan Broka 
Item 
PROFESSIONAL NURbcS 
LIABILITY PROGRAM 
DECLARATIONS 
NAME OF INSURED AND ADDRESS (Number & Street, City. State & Zip) 
Troy Alan Broka 
376i Dimdas Road 
Beaverton, MI 48612-9159 
POLICY TERM
 12:01 A H STANDARD TIME 
/ i*t> l*r L tftry ln-i * T VOUR ADDRESS Afi 
4 / 2 2 / 9 6 j o 4/ 22/97 STATED ABOVE. T 
for ABC 
CNA Insurance Companies 
C N A Plaza 
Oi»cago, Illinois 60605 
INSURANCE IS PROVIDED BY THE COMPANY DESIGNATED BELOW (A stock insurance company, herein called We, Us or Our) 
American Casualty Company of Reading, Pa. 
LIMITS OF LIABILITY COVERAGE PART 
S 1 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 each medical incident 
PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY 
$ 3 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 aggregate 
$ 1 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 each incident NON-BUSINESS ACTIVITIES 
1 ,000 .00 each person 
MEDICAL EXPENSE 
50,000.00 aggregate 
Included each claim 
PERSONAL INJURY 
Included aggregate 
300.00 per day 
DEFENDANTS REIMBURSEMENT 
6 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 pre trial/proceeding 
1 ,000 .00 per assault FIRST PARTY ASSAULT 
92 .00 ANNUAL PREMIUM FOR THIS POLICY 
Printed Endorsements Attached At Policy Issuance (Insert Form Numbers): 
G-58Q32-B, G-U715-021 , G-58033-A21 
This Policy shall not be valid unless countersigned by a duly authorized representative of this Company. 
Chairman of the Board j  Secretory C—-> 
^ U A ^ 
G-42098-&O) 
(fid 4/92) 
Countersigned by
 ( 
Authorized Representative 
9, Wo 
CA/A 
F.»r AM the 0>mmien»^i» Vug ,Mukt-
STATE PROVISIONS—MICHIGAN 
Any cancellation or non-renewal provisions contained 
m the policy to which this endorsement is attached 
are deleted and replaced by the following: 
I, Cancellation 
A. This policy c^n De cancelled by either the first 
of you named or us., 
1. You can cancel this policy at any time. To 
do sor you must: 
a. return the policy to us or any of our 
authorized representatives; or 
b. give notice to us or any of our authorized 
representatives; 
stating when the cancellation is to be 
effective. We must receive the policy or 
written notice before the cancellation date. 
2. We can cancel this policy by giving written 
notice to you at least: 
a. 10 days, if cancellation is for non-
payment of premium. However, you may 
continue the coverage by payment in full 
at any time prior to the date the 
cancellation is effective; or 
b. 30 days, if cancellation is for any other 
reason; 
before the date the cancellation is effective. 
B. We will mail or deliver notice to you at the last 
mailing address known to us or our authorized 
representative. 
C. Notice of cancellation will state the date the 
cancellation is effective. The policy will end 
on that date. The grounds for such 
cancellation shall also be stated, and upon 
your written request, we shall furnish the facts 
upon which the cancellation is based. 
0- If notice is mailed, proof of mailing will be 
sufficient proof of notice. 
E. If this policy is cancelled, we will send the 
first of you named any premium refund due. 
The refund will be on a pro-rata basis, subject 
to a minimum earned premium ot S25.00. 
The cancellation will be effective even if we 
have not made or offered a refund. 
F if this policy has been in effect for more than 
90 days, or is a renewal, we shall not cancel 
this policy except for one or more of the 
following conditions: 
1. non-payment of premium; 
2, any: 
a, material misrepresentation; or 
b. non-disdosure of any fact which if 
known would affect insurability or cause 
the policy noc to be issued; 
by or with the knowledge of you or your 
representatives; 
3. any fraud relating to this policy or to a claim 
made under this policy; 
4. actions by you that have -substantially 
increased or changed the risk insured; 
5. discovery of any willful or reckless acts or 
omissions by you which increases ttie 
hazard insured against; 
6. a material increase in the hazard insured 
against: 
a. which coufd not have been reasonably 
contemplated at the inception of the 
contract; 
b. including such increase as a result of 
x^nange^ in rxries, "legmtetion or court 
decision; 
7. failure to comply with reasonable loss 
control or safety recommendations; 
8. substantial breach of contractual duties, 
conditions or agreements; 
9. substantial loss of reinsurance by us 
affecting this particular type of insurance, 
certified to the insurance regulatory 
authority. 
Non-ftertewal 
If we decide not to renew this policy, 45 days 
advance written notice shall be mailed or 
delivered to you at the address last known by us 
or our authorized representative. The notice shall 
include the reason for such nonrenewal* 
This provision shall not apply in the event: 
A. of non-payment of premium; 
EL we have implied or consented to renewal; or 
C. you have: 
1. requested OT atjrest} to riotvrenewaV, or 
2. insured elsewhere or accepted replacement 
coverage. 
In the event we are willing to renew this policy, 
a premium billing notice shall be mailed or 
delivered to you at the address test known to us 
or our authorized representative not less than 45 
days in advance of the renewal or anniversary 
date of this policy. The premium billing notice 
shall be based upon the rates and rules 
applicable to the ensuing policy period, 
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For Attachment to Policy 
WAIVER OF EXCLUSION 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
We agree with you that the exclusion referring "to an award of punitive or exemplary damages" does not apply to your 
policy. 
All other provisions of the policy remain unchanged. 
G^41529-B99 
For Attachment to Policy • 
MICHIGAN STATE PROVISION 
STATE LAW 
If this Coverage Part conflicts with state or local laws, then it is changed to conform with the laws. 
All other provisions o( the policy remain unchanged. 
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GENERAL POLICY CONDITIONS 
I. Policy Period 
We are providing insurance under this policy beginning at 12:01 a.m. and ending at 12:01 a.m. during the 
policy period shown on the policy Declarations. 
II. Premium 
All premium charges under this policy will be computed according to our rules and rating plans which apply 
at the inception of the current policy period. Premiums for this policy may be paid to us or our authorized 
representative. The first premium is due on the Inception date of coverage. 
III. Separation of Insureds 
This policy applies separately to each of you against whom claim is brought except with respect to: 
A. the limits of liability; and 
B. any of your duties as the first named on the Declarations. 
IV. Transfer of Interest 
You must first obtain our written consent to transfer or assign this policy. If you die, the policy will continue 
for the remaining part of the policy period; first, for the benefit of your legal representative while acting 
within their duties as such, and second, for the benefit of anyone having proper temporary custody of your 
property until a legal representative is appointed. 
V. Changes 
Notice to any of our agents or knowledge possessed by any such agent or any other person shall not act 
as a waiver or change in any part of this policy. It also will not prevent us from asserting any rights under 
the provisions of this policy. None of the provisions of this policy will be waived, changed or modified 
except by written endorsement Issued to form a part of this policy. 
VI. Your Duties in the Event of a Claim 
If there is a claim or you reasonably think there will be, you must do the following: 
A. notify us and your insurance agent in writing as soon as possible; 
B. specify the names and addresses of the injured person(s) and any witnesses. Provide us with infor-
mation on the time, place and nature of the event; 
C. immediately forward all documents which you receive In connection with the claim to us; 
D. fully cooperate with us or our designee in the making of settlements, the conduct of suits or other 
proceedings, enforcing any right of contribution or indemnity against another who may be liable to 
you because of injury or damage. You shall attend hearings and trials, assist in securing and giving 
evidence, and obtaining the attendance of witnesses; 
E. refuse, except at your own cost to voluntarily make any payment, assume any obligation or Incur any 
expense other than reasonable medical expenses incurred at the time of an event. 
VII. Transfer of Rights of Recovery 
If you, or any entity for whom we make payment under this policy have rights to recover amounts from 
another, those rights are transferred to us to the extent of our payment. You, or such other entity, must do 
everything necessary to secure our rights and must do nothing after injury or damage to impair them. 
VIII. Other Insurance 
If other valid and collectible insurance Is available to you for a claim we cover under this policy, our obligations 
are limited as follows: 
Excess Insurance 
This insurance is excess over any other insurance, self-insurance, self-Insured retention or similar programs, 
whether primary, excess, contingent or on any other basis. 
We will have no duty to defend any claim that any other insurer has a duty to defend. If no other insurer 
defends, we will do so, but we will be entitled to your rights against all those other insurers. 
G-58032-B 
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We will pay only our share of the amount of the loss, if any, that exceeds the sum of: 
A. the total amount that all such other insurance would pay in absence of this Insurance; and 
B. the total of all deductible and self-insured amounts under all such other insurance or other available 
program. 
This Insurance does not apply to other insurance that was bought by you specifically to apply m excess of 
the Limits of Liability shown on the Declarations of this policy. 
IX. Overlap of Insurance 
If more than one coverage or Coverage Part of this policy applies to the same or related claim, we will not, 
for any reason, pay more than the limit of liability applicable to the most specifically described coverage. 
X. Legal Action Limitation 
You may not bring any legal action against us concerning this policy until: 
A. you have fully complied with all the provisions of this policy; and 
B, the amount of your obligation to pay has been decided. Such amount can be set by judgment against 
you after actual trial or by written agreement beween you, us and the claimant. 
Any entity, or their legal representative, is entitled to recover under this policy after they have secured a 
judgment or written agreement. Recovery is limited to the extent of the insurance afforded by this policy. 
No entity has any right under this policy to include us in any action against you to determine your liability, 
nor will we be brought into such an action by you or your representative. If you or your estate becomes 
bankrupt or insolvent, it does not change any of our obligations under this policy. 
XI. Concealment, Misrepresentation, Fraud 
This policy Is void in any case of fraud by you relating to it. It Is also void If you Intentionally conceal or 
misrepresent a material fact or circumstance concerning: 
A. this policy; 
B. any covered property; or 
C. your interest in the covered property or this insurance. 
XII. NorvRenewal 
We can non-renew this policy by giving written notice to the first of you named on the Declarations, at your 
last known address, at least 30 days before the expiration date. 
If notice is mailed, proof of mailing will be sufficient proof of notice. 
XIII. Cancellation 
This policy can be canceled by either the first of you named on the Declarations or us. 
A. The first of you named can cancel this policy at any time. To do so, you must: 
1. return the policy to us or any of our authorized representatives; or 
2. mail a written notice to us, telling when the cancellation is to be effective. 
We must receive the policy or written notice before the cancellation date. 
B. We can cancel this policy by giving written notice to the first of you named on the Declarations, at 
your last known address at least: 
t, 10 days, if we cancel for non-payment of premium; or 
2, 30 days, if we cancel for any other reason; 
before the effective date of cancellation. 
C. Notice of cancellation will state the effective date of cancellation. The policy will end on that date. 
D. If we cancel, the refund will be pro-rata. If you cancel, the refund may be less than pro-rata. The 
cancellation will be effective even If we have not made or offered a refund. 
E. If notice is mailed, proof of mailing will be sufficient proof of notice. 
XIV. Definitions 
tf any of the following terms are used in this policy, they will only have the meaning as shown: 
"Anti-trust law" means those laws listed in: 
A. Title 15, Section 12, of the United States Code; 
B. the Federal Trade Commission Act; and 
C. any similar state law. 
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"Asbestos" means the mineral in any form whether or not the asbestos was at any time: 
A. airborne as a fiber, particle or dust; 
B. contained in or formed a part of a product, structure or other real or personal property; 
C. carried on clothing; 
D. inhaled or ingested; or 
E. transmitted by any other means. 
"Auto" means a land motor vehicle, trailer or semi-trailer designed for use on public roads. Any attached 
apparatus or machinery is included. Mobile equipment is not included. . 
"Claim Expenses" means 
A. fees charged by any attorney we designate; and 
B, all other fees, costs, and expenses which result from the investigation, adjustment, defense and appeal 
of a claim. 
These expenses must be incurred by us, or by you with our prior written consent. 
"Claim Expenses" do not include: 
A, salary charges of you or our regular employees or Company officials; or 
B. fees and expenses of independent adjusters. 
"Coverage Territory11 means: 
A. the United States of America, including its territories and possessions; 
B. Puerto Rico; and 
C. Canada. 
"Damage" means: 
A. physical injury to tangible property, including all resulting loss of use of that property; or 
B. loss of use of tangible property that is not physically injured. 
"Hazardous Properties" includes radioactive, toxic or explosive properties. 
"Hostile Fire" means one which becomes uncontrollable or breaks out from where it was intended to be. 
"Injury" means bodily injury, sickness, disease, mental or emotional distress, sustained by a person. Also 
included is death at any time as a result. 
"Loading or unloading" means the handling of property: 
A. after it is moved from the place where it is accepted for movement Into or onto an aircraft, watercraft 
or auto; 
B. while It is in or on an aircraft, watercraft or auto; or 
C. while it is being moved from an aircraft, watercraft or auto to the place where it is finally delivered. 
"Loading or unloading" does not mean the movement of property by means of a mechanical device, other 
than a hand truck, that Is not attached to the aircraft, watercraft or auto. 
"Mobile Equipment" means a land motor vehicle; whether or not self-propelled, that is not subject to any 
motor vehicle registration and which is used primarily on your premises, or designed principally for use off 
public roads or highways. 
"Named Insured" means the entity named on the Declarations of this policy as the named insured. 
"Nuclear Facility" means: 
A. any nuclear reactor; 
B. any equipment or device designed or used for 
1. separating the isotopes of uranium or plutonlum, 
2. processing or utilizing spent fuel, or 
3* handling, processing or packaging waste; 
C. any equipment or device used for the processing, fabricating or alloying of special nuclear material if 
at any time the total amount of such material In your custody at the premises where such equipment 
or device Is located consists of or contains more than 25 grams of plutonium or uranium 233 or any 
combination thereof, or more than 250 grams of uranium 235; 
D. any structure, basin, excavation, premises or place prepared or used for the storage or disposal of 
waste. 
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Nuclear Facility also includes the site on which any of the foregoing is located, all operations conducted 
on such site and all premises used for such operations. 
'•Nuclear Reactor" means any apparatus designed or used to sustain nuclear fission in a self-supporting 
chain reaction or to contain a critical mass of fissionable material; 
With respect to Injury to or destruction of property, the word injury or "destruction" includes ail forms of 
radioactive contamination of property or loss of use. 
"Pollutants11 means any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or contaminant, including smoke, vapor, 
soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals and waste. Waste includes materials to be recycled, reconditioned or 
reclaimed. 
"Pollution" means the actual, alleged or threatened discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release or 
escape of pollutants; 
A. At or from any premises, site or location: 
1. which is or was at any time: 
a. owned, occupied, rented or loaned to you; 
b. used by or for any of you or others for the handling, storage, disposal, processing or treatment 
of waste; 
2> on which any of you or any contractors or subcontractors working directly or indirectly on your 
behalf are performing operations: 
a. if the pollutants are brought on or to the premises, site or location in connection with such 
operations by you, any contractor or subcontractor; or 
b. if the operations are to test for, monitor, clean up, remove, contain, treat, detoxify or neutralize 
or in any way respond to, or assess the effects of pollutants; 
B. which are or were at any time transported, handled, stored, treated, disposed of, or processed as waste 
by or for any of you or anyone for whom you may be legally responsible. 
"Pollution" does not mean heat, smoke or fumes from a hostile fire. 
"Source Material", "Special Nuclear Material", and "By-product Material" have the meanings given them in 
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 or any of its amendments. 
"Spent fuel" means any fuel element or fuel component, solid or liquid, which has been used or exposed 
to radiation in a "nuclear reactor". 
"Waste" means any waste material: 
A. containing by-product material other than the tailings or wastes produced by the extraction or concen-
tration of uranium or thorium from any ore processed primarily for its source material content; and 
B. resulting from the operation by any entity of any nuclear facility included under the first two paragraphs 
of the definition of nuclear facility. 
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NURSES PROFESSIONAL LIABILIl 1 
COVERAGE PART 
We are the stock insurance company designated on the Declarations We agreee with you as follows: 
I COVERAGE AGREEMENTS 
A. We will pay all amounts, up to our limit of liability, which you become legally obligated to pay as 
a result of injury or damage caused by a medical incident by you or anyone for whose professional 
acts or omissions you are legally responsible. 
B. The medical incident as described above, must happen on or after the effective date and prior to 
the end of the policy period stated on the Declarations. 
C. We have the right and will defend any claim with an attorney of our choice. We will: 
1. do this even if any of the charges of the claim are groundless, false or fraudulent; 
2. investigate and settle any claim as we feel appropriate. 
Our payment of the limit of liability ends our duty to defend or settle. We have no duty to defend 
any claim not covered by this policy. 
IL EXCLUSIONS 
We will not defend or pay under this Coverage Part for 
A. any injury or damage arising out of any professional services provided by you prior to the effective 
date of this policy; 
B. any claim resulting from a medical Incident which rs also a willful violation of a statute, ordinance 
or regulation imposing criminal penalties. 
However, we will defend any civil suit against you seeking amounts which would be covered if 
this exclusion did not apply. 
In such case, we will only pay fees, costs and expenses of such defense; 
C. any claim made against you, or any person whose acts or omissions you are legally responsible, 
alleging any act of sexual intimacy, sexual molestation or sexual assault 
However, we will defend any civil suit against you seeking amounts which would be covered if 
this exclusion did not apply. In such case, we will only pay fees, costs and expenses of such 
defense; 
D. any of your actions or omissions: 
1. as a licensed or certified; 
a. nurse anesthetist, nurse-midwife or nurse practitioner, 
b. physician or surgeon assistant; 
c. emergency medical technician; or 
d. flight nurse; 
2. related to x-ray therapy; 
3. as a student nurse or nurse's aide who is not under the direct supervision of a physician, 
nurse or other licensed medical professional or who is not employed at a hospital, nursing 
home or other health care facility; 
E. any liability you have as a proprietor, superintendent, director, administrative or executive officer 
of any: 
1. hospital, nursing home or sanitarium; 
2. clinic, including those with bed and board facilities; or 
3. laboratory or business, 
This exclusion does not apply to a medical incident arising out of the providing of professional 
services by you or anyone acting under your direction or control; 
R any liability you assume under any contract or agreement. 
This exclusion does not apply to a warranty of fitness or quality of any therapeutic agents or 
supplies you have furnished or supplied in connection with treatment you have performed, or to 
liability for Injury or damage that you would have In the absence of an employment contract or 
agreement; 
G. any claim by: 
1. an employee of yours arising out of and in the course of employment by you; or 
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2, the spouse, cmld, parent, brother, or sister of that employee as a consequence of 1. above; 
This exclusion does not apply to any claim resulting from Immediate medical or surgical care 
given to an employee after injury, and/or to a medical incident arising from your professional 
services to an employee; 
H. any amounts which you or any party must pay under any unemployment or workers' compensation, 
disability benefits, or other similar law; 
I. any punitive or exemplary amounts; 
J. any fines, penalties, the return or withdrawal of fees or government payments imposed directly 
upon you; 
K. any multiplication of amounts payable under this policy, imposed by law; 
L. any Injury or damage which was expected or intended by you. 
This exclusion does not apply to any injury that results from the use of reasonable physical force 
to protect any person(s) or property; 
M. any claim arising out of actual or alleged involvement in any: 
1. anti-trust law violation; or 
2. agreement or conspiracy to restrain trade. 
This exclusion does not apply to claim(s) arising from your activity as a member of any 
committee, panel, or board which provides underwriting or claims(s) advice or recommen-
dations on our behalf, provided your activity is within the scope of the committee's, panel's 
or board's established guidelines; 
N. any claims) caused by pollution regardless of cause; 
O. any injury, or destruction; 
1. with respect to which you are also an insured under a Nuclear Energy Liability Policy Issued 
by: 
a. Nuclear Energy Liability insurance Association; 
b. Mutual Atomic Energy Liability Underwriters; or 
c. Nuclear Insurance Association of Canada, 
or would be an insured under any such policy if it had not terminated due to exhaustion of 
its limits of liability; or 
2. resulting from the hazardous properties of nuclear material and with respect to which: 
a. any entity is required to maintain financial protection pursuant to the Atomic Energy 
Act of 1954 or any of its amendments, or 
b. you are, or had this policy not been Issued would be, entitled to indemnity from the 
United States of America or any of its agencies, under any agreement entered into by 
the United States of America or any of its agencies with any entity; 
3. resulting from the hazardous properties of nuclear material if: 
a. the nuclear material: 
i. is at any nuclear facility owned or operated by or on your behalf; or 
ii. has been discharged or dispersed therefrom; or 
Hi. is contained in spent fuel or waste at any time possessed, handled, used, 
processed, stored, transported or disposed of by or on your behalf; or 
b. the injury or destruction arises out of the furnishing by you of services, materials, parts 
or equipment in connection with the planning, construction, maintenance, operation or 
use of any nuclear facility. 
If such facility Is within the United States of America, its territories, possessions or 
Canada, this sub-paragraph 3.b. applies only to injury to or destruction of property at 
such nuclear facility. 
P. any claim for: 
1. any Injury, or damage arising out of the actual, alleged or threatened exposure at any time 
to asbestos; or 
2. any los§, cost or expense that may be awarded or incurred: 
a. by reason of a claim or suit for any such Injury, damage; or 
b. in complying with a governmental directive or request to test for, monitor, clean up, 
remove, contain or dispose of asbestos. 
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Q. any liability resulting from owning, using, taking care of, loading or unloading or the entrustment 
to others of any auto, mobile equipment, watercraft, or aircraft; 
R. any liability resulting from an auto, mobile equipment, watercraft or aircraft which you own and 
operate, or which Is operated for you by an employee in the course of their employment; 
S. any claim arising out of any: 
1. refusal to employ; 
2. termination of employment; 
3. coercion, demotion, reassignment, defamation, harassment, humiliation, discrimination or 
other employment related, practices, policies, acts or omissions; or 
4. actual or alleged discrimination by you; 
LIMITS OF LIABILITY 
A. Each Claim 
The limit of liability stated for "each claim" is the limit of our liability for any claim or claims 
arising out of, or in connection with, the same or related medical incident. 
B. Aggregate 
Subject to provision A. above, the total limit of our liability for all claims shall not exceed the limit 
of liability stated as "aggregate". 
All medical Incidents for which claims are made during the policy period are included. The aggregate 
limit of liability applies to each annual policy period. 
The limits apply regardless of the number of persons or organizations who are covered under this 
policy. 
C. Claim expenses are in addition to, and not a part of the Limit of Liability. 
D. We will also pay reasonable expenses you incur, including loss of income, as a result of being a 
defendant or co-defendant in a civil suit resulting from a medical incident involving actual or 
alleged injury or damage covered by this policy. 
These amounts must result from your being required by us or the defense attorney to attend a 
trial or proceeding of the suit or arbitration proceedings. 
You must give us, or any of our authorized representatives written notice of the expenses incurred, 
as soon as practicable, following the last date that such expenses were incurred. 
This notice must contain sufficient information and detail to identify you, the time, place and 
circumstances that resulted In these expenses. You must also identify the court and all parties 
to the action before the court. 
Our limit of liability for expenses incurred, including loss of income, resulting from your attendance 
at one or more trials, proceedings or arbitration proceedings arising out of the same or actual or 
alleged cause of action, shall be limited to the maximum amount stated on the Declarations as 
per trial/proceeding, regardless of the number of days you are required to attend such trials or 
proceedings. 
Our obligation to pay such expenses Is further limited to the maximum amount stated on the 
Declarations as per day, for any one day of attendance at such trials or proceedings. 
ADDITIONAL DEFINITIONS 
"Claim" means the receipt by you of a demand for money or services naming you and alleging a 
medical incident. 
All claims arising out of the same medical incident will be considered as having been made at the time 
the first claim was made. 
"Injury", as defined in the General Policy Conditions section, shall also mean, with respect only to 
your professional services, claims resulting from: 
A. testimony given at or arising out of inquests; 
B. malicious prosecution; 
C. false arrest, detention, imprisonment, wrongful entry or eviction or other Invasion of the right of 
private occupancy; 
D. libel, slander or other disparaging materials; 
E. a violation of an individual's right to privacy; 
F. assault, battery, mental anguish, mental shock or hallucination. 
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"Medical Incident" means any act, error or omission in your providing or failure to provide professional 
services. This includes your responsibility for anyone acting under your direction or control. 
"Professional Services" means those services for which you are licensed, trained and qualified to 
perform in your capacity as a: 
A. registered or visiting nurse; 
B. licensed practical or vocational nurse; or 
C. student nurse or nurse's aide while under the direct supervision of a physician, nurse or other 
licensed medical professional. 
"Professional Services" also means your services as a member of a formal accreditation, standards 
review, or similar professional board or committee related only to a professional nursing society 
or a hospital. 
''You" or "Your" means the individual named on the Declarations of this policy as the Named 
Insured. 
ADDITIONAL CONDITION 
Policy Territory 
This coverage applies to medical incidents taking place anywhere In the world. Claim and suit must be 
made against you, however, in the Coverage Territory. 
FIRST PARTY ASSAULT COVERAGE 
We will pay, up to the maximum amount stated on the Declarations for "First Party Assault Coverage", for injury 
to you or damage to your personal property caused by an assault by, or at the direction of another upon you. 
Such assault must happen on your work premises, including the ways immediately adjoining such work premises, 
or while you are away from such work premises conducting authorized work activity. 
This coverage does not apply to damage to any mode of transportation used by you to go to and from your work 
premises, or damage to any business or personal property owned, leased or rented by any other person or 
business enterprise while in your possession. 
This coverage applies as excess over any other available insurance covering such loss. 
For the purpose of this coverage, "assault" means any willful attempt or threat to inflict Injury upon the person 
of another, when coupled with an apparent present ability so to do, and any intentional display of force such as 
would give the victim reason to fear or expect immediate bodily harm. 
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PERSONAL LIABILITY 
COVERAGE PART 
We are the stock insurance company designated on the Declarations. We agree with you as follows: 
I, COVERAGE AGREEMENTS 
A. We will pay all amounts, up to our limit of liability, which you become legally obligated to pay as 
a result of Injury or damage covered by this policy. The Injury or damage must be caused by your 
non-business activities. 
B. We will pay all amounts for necessary medical expenses Incurred, or medically ascertained within 
three (3) years from the date of an accident, resulting in the injury. The injury must be to a 
person(s)and happen: 
1. at your insured location and such person(s) must be present at such location with your 
permission; 
2. off the Insured location premises if the injury: 
a* arises out of a condition at the insured location or immediately adjoining approaches; 
or 
b. is caused by; 
i. your non-business activities; 
II. a residence employee in the course of their duties as such; or 
iii. an animal which you own or which is in your care or custody. 
The injured person(s), or someone acting on their behalf must: 
1. give us written proof of claim, under oath if required, as soon as practicable; and 
2. execute authorization to allow us to obtain copies of all medical documents relating to such 
injury. 
The injured person(s) shall submit to physical examination by a physician selected by us when, 
and as often as we may reasonably require. 
Any payment made under this provision does not constitute an admission of any guilt or liability 
by either you or us. 
C. Payments For Which You Are Not Legally Liable: 
1. First Aid To Others: 
We will pay all medical related expenses for which you have voluntarily made payment or 
incur, up to a maximum of $500, for first aid being rendered to others as a result of any injury 
covered by this policy. 
The first aid must be provided with a 48 hour period after the injury happens. This provision 
does not apply to any person as defined as you in this policy. 
2. Damage To Property Of Others: 
We will pay up to a maximum of $250 for any one incident for damage to the property of 
others that is caused by you. We will not pay for damage to the property of others if such 
damage: 
a. is caused intentionally by any person defined as you under this policy who has reached 
the age of majority in your state; 
b. is caused by any tenant, or any other person not qualifying for coverage under the 
definition of you in this policy, who Is residing in your residence premises. 
c. arises out of: 
i. any business pursuit; 
ii. any act or omission with regard to any premises, other than your residence 
premises, which you own, rent or control; 
iii. your owning, using, taking care of, or entrustment to others of an auto, mobile 
equipment, waste or aircraft. 
Within 60 days from the date of loss, you must submit a sworn statement of such loss to 
us. You must also exhibit the damaged property if such property Is In your possession and/ 
or control. 
D. The injury or damage as described above, must happen on or after the effective date and prior to 
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the end of the policy period stated on the Declarations. 
E. We have the right and will defend any claim. We will: 
1. do this even if any of the charges of the claim are groundless, false or fraudulent; 
2. investigate and settle any claim as we feel appropriate. 
EXCLUSIONS 
We will not defend or pay under this Coverage Part for: 
A. any injury or damage which was expected or intended by you. 
This exclusion does not apply to any Injury that results from the use of reasonable physical force 
to protect any person(s) or property; 
B. any damage to property; 
1, you own, rent, occupy or use; or 
2. which is in your care, custody or control; 
C. any injury or damage caused by or resulting from your business pursuits, or the rental or holding 
for rental for any part of any premises by you. 
This exclusion does not apply to: 
1. any activity which is ordinarily incidental to non-business pursuits; or 
2. the rental of or holding for rental of your residence premises: 
a. on an occasional basis for the exclusive use as a residence; 
b. in part, unless intended for use as a residence by more than 2 roomers or boarders; 
c. in part, as an office, school, studio or private garage; 
D. medical expenses for any person while on your premises because business pursuits are conducted 
or any professional services are rendered on such premises; 
E. any injury or damage arising out of an auto, mobile equipment water or aircraft which; 
1. you own, take care of, operate, load or unload, lease or rent, or entrust to others; 
2. is loaned to you or is operated, loaded or unloaded for you or on your behalf by an employee 
in the course of their employment by you. 
This exclusion does not apply to your watercraft if; 
1. it is stored at an insured location; 
2. it Is owned by or rented to you and: 
a. Is an Inboard or in board-outdrive with motor power of less than 50 horsepower; or 
b. Is a sailing vessel with or without auxiliary power, and less than 26 feet in overall length; 
3. you own, or report to us in writing within 45 days after the acquisition of a watercraft, powered 
by one or more outboard motors with less than 25 total horsepower; 
F. injury to any of your employees arising out of: 
1. any premises owned or rented to you for which is not an insured location; or 
2. their employment by you. 
This exclusion does not apply to: 
1, any residence employees, If the injury results from their residence employment; or 
2. a claim resulting from immediate care given to an employee after the injury; 
G. any amounts which you or any party must pay under any unemployment or workers' compensation, 
disability benefits, or other similar law; 
H. any liability you assume under any contract or agreement, 
I. any injury or damage caused by or resulting from: 
1. war, either directly or indirectly, including undeclared and civil war, 
2. Insurrection, rebellion or revolution; 
3. warlike acts by a military force or personnel; 
4. destruction or seizure of property for a military purpose; or 
5. nuclear reaction, radiation or contamination, regardless of cause. 
LIMITS OF LIABILITY 
A. Each Incident 
The limit of liability stated for "each Incident" is the limit of our liability for all injury or damage 
arising out of, or in connection with, the same or related Incident. This limit applies regardless of 
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the number of you covered by, or claims made under this policy. 
B. Medical Expenses 
1. Each Person: 
Our total limit of liability for all medical expenses payable for any one person who sustains 
injury as a result of a single incident, shall not exceed the amount stated on the Declarations 
as "Each Person". 
2. Aggregate: 
Our total limit of liability for all medical expenses payable for all persons who sustain injury as a 
result of a single Incident, shall not exceed the amount stated on the Declarations as Aggregate". 
This limit applies regardless of the number of you covered by, or claims made under this policy. 
IV. ADDITIONAL DEFINITIONS 
"Business" means a trade, profession or occupation, 
"Claim" means the receipt by you of a demand for money or services naming you and alleging injury 
or damage. 
"Incident" means an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions which: 
A. results in injury and/or damage; and 
B. was not expected nor intended by you. 
Injury and damage arising from exposure to substantially the same general conditions shall be con-
sidered as one Incident 
"Insured Location" means: 
A. your residence premises; 
B. that part of any other premises, structures and grounds: 
1. used by you as a residence and which is shown on the Declarations; or 
2, which Is acquired by you during the policy period for your use as a residence; 
C. any premises used by you in connection with the premises included in A. and B. above; 
D. any part of a premises not owned by you but where you are temporarily residing; 
E. vacant land owned by or rented to you other than farm land; 
F land owned by or rented to you on which a one or two family dwelling is being constructed as a 
residence for you; 
G. individual or family cemetery plots or burial vaults of yours; and 
H. any part of a premises occasionally rented to you for other than business purposes. 
"Residence Employee" means an employee of yours who performs duties: 
A. in connection with the maintenance or use of the residence premises, Including household or 
domestic services; or 
B. elsewhere of a similar nature not in connection with your business. 
"Residence Premises" means: 
A. the one to four family dwelling, other structures and grounds; or 
B. that part of any other building where you reside and which Is shown as the residence premises 
on the Declarations. 
"You" or "Your" means: 
A. the named Insured shown on the Declarations; 
B. the following residents of your household, as respects non-business activities: 
1. your relatives; 
2. any other person, under the age of 21, who is In your care or the care of your relatives; 
C. with respect to animals or watercraft to which this policy applies: 
1. any entity legally responsible for such animals or watercraft: 
a. which are owned by you; or 
b. owned by your relatives or someone in your care: 
2. this does not include any entity using such watercraft or having custody of such animals in 
the course of any business, or without permission of the owner; and 
D. with respect to any auto or mobile equipment to which this policy applies, any person engaged in 
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your employment or the employment of any person Included as an insured under this definition. 
V. AMENDED DEFINITION 
For the purpose of this Coverage Part, the terms auto and mobile equipment when used in Section ll.T 
Exclusions does not apply to: 
A. a motorized land vehicle in dead storage at an insured location; 
B. any watercraft, trailer, camper trailer or utility type trailer not being towed by or carried on a motor 
vehicle; or 
C. any motorized golf cart, while being used for golfing purposes. 
VI. AMENDED/ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS 
A, General Condition VII., Transfer of Rights of Recovery Is replaced in its entirety by the following: 
Transfer of Rights of Recovery 
If you, or any entity for whom we make payment under this policy has rights to recover amounts 
from another, those rights are transferred to us to the extent of our payment. You, or such other 
entity, must do everything necessary to secure our rights and must do nothing after injury or 
damage to impair them. 
With respect to nonbusiness liability, you may waive all rights of recovery against any person. 
However, such waiver must be provided in writing prior to any loss. If these rights are not waived, 
we may require an assignment of rights of recovery for a loss, to the extent that payment Is made 
by us, 
If an assignment is sought by us, you must sign and deliver all related documents to us and 
cooperate with us in any reasonable manner. 
This right to recover does not apply to any medical expenses coverage, or any damage to property 
for which you are not legally liable. 
B. Policy Territory 
This coverage applies to Injury and/or damage which happens, and for which claim is first made 
against you, within the Coverage Territory. 
XL/, w- ChMfecL^cA^ \cj U4. 
Chairman of the Board Secretary 
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ADDENDUM F 
Letter from American Casualty to University, dated July 17,1997 
Sen Diego Service Office 
P.O. Box 87334 
San Diego, CaBfomia 92138-7334 
Fax Number (619} 296-7663 
CNA HealthPro 
July 17, 1997 
Mr. David G. Williams 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5000 
Re: Our Insured 
Our Claim No. 
Claimant 
D/Occurrence 
Issuing Co. 
Dear Mr. Williams: 
Troy Alan Broyka 
HM-004840-TI 
Abel Hepworth(deceased) 
4/14/97 
American Casualty Company of Reading, PA 
This will confirm your letter of June 11, 1997 in which you invite our participation in the settlement 
of the case brought by the family of Abel Hepworth. 
Pursuant to your request, I am enclosing a copy of Mr. Broka's policy. I would appreciate it if you 
would send a copy of the University's liability policy. 
Under the terms of Mr. Broka's policy with American Casualty Company, we would be considered 
an excess carrier at best. The General Policy Conditions state in part: 
"VIII. OTHER INSURANCE 
If other valid and collectible insurance is available to you for a claim we cover under this 
policy, our obligations are limited as follows: 
Excess Insurance 
This insurance is excess over any other insurance, self-insurance, self-insured retention 
or similiar programs, whether primary, excess, contingent or on any other basis. 
We will have no duty to defend any claim that any other insurer has a duty to defend. If 
no other insurer defends, we will do so, but we will be entitiled to your rights against all 
those other insurers. 
HM-004832-TI -2- July 17, 1997 
We will pay only our share of the amount of the loss, if any, that exceeds the sum of: 
A. the total amount that all other such other insurance would pay in absence of this 
insurance, 
B. the total of all deductible and self-insured amounts under all such other insurance 
and other available programs." 
In addition to the language cited above, Mr. Broka is an employee of the University of Utah Health 
Sciences Center and as such should be defended under their policy. We respectfully decline to 
participate in the settlement of this matter. If you have any questions regarding this letter, please 
do not hesitate to call. 
Sincerely, 
Deborah C. Ellis 
Claims Specialist 
(619)682-3512 
ADDENDUM G 
Affidavit of Nurse Troy Alan Broka 
Jaryl L. R e n c h e r # 4 9 0 3 ' •'"*"'r 
EPPERSON & RENCHER, PC 
10 West 100 South, #500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 983-9800 
Alec Barinholtz (Pro Hac Vice) 
Jennifer Mathis (Pro Hac Vice) 
ROSS, DIXON & BELL, L.L.P. 
5 Park Plaza, Suite 1200 
Irvine, California 92614-8529 
Telephone: (949) 622-2700 
Attorneys for Defendant American Casualty Company of Reading, PA 
THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH HOSPITAL and 
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH, ; 
Plaintiffs, 
v. ] 
AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY OF ] 
READING, PA ; 
ST. PAUL FERE AND MARINE ] 
INSURANCE COMPANY, a Minnesota ; 
Corporation, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
v . • ] 
AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY OF ) 
READING, PA, and TROY ALAN ] 
BROKA, ] 
Defendants. ] 
) AFFIDAVIT OF TROY ALAN 
) BROKA IN SUPPORT OF 
) DEFENDANT AMERICAN 
) CASUALTY COMPANY OF 
) READING, PA'S MOTION FOR 
) SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
» Case No. 98091315^0 
\ 
) Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
Itf 
I, TROY ALAN BROKA, after being duly cautioned and sworn, state as follows: 
1. If called to testify in this matter, I could and would testify competently to the 
following facts, which are within my personal knowledge. 
2. From January 1, 1997 until the end of April, 1997,1 was employed by the 
University of Utah Hospital (the "Hospital") as a registered nurse. I worked in the neural 
intensive care unit at the Hospital and signed a contract with the University after completing 
a brief one to two day orientation at the Hospital. 
3. I was employed by the Hospital at the time I provided nursing care for Abel 
Hepworth at the Hospital in April 1997. 
4. I have never received by certified mail or in any other fashion any kind of 
notice that the Hepworths intended to commence a malpractice action against rne or pursue 
any other claim against me. It was my understanding that the Hepworth's claim was against 
the University and that the Hepworths were not pursuing me directly. 
5. I never was told by either the University or anyone representing its insurer 
St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company that either intended to sue me in connection 
with the Hepworth's claim against the University. 
6. I never made a demand for defense or indemnity on American Casualty nor 
did I ever seek coverage under the American Casualty Policy in connection with the 
Hepworth matter. 
7. I personally never incurred any defense expenses in connection v/ith the 
Hepworth matter, nor, to my knowledge, did I incur any other obligations to pay any 
amounts in connection with the settlement of the Hepworth matter. 
-1-
DATED this j M day of February, 2002. 
(Xh^^sJ)^. 
Troy Alan Broka, R.N. 
STATE OF MICHIGAN ) 
1 I : S S } 
COUNTY OF lryst\g^v i ) 
On this j l } f^ day of February, 2002, personally appeared before me Troy Alan 
Broka, R.N., who being first duly sworn up his oath states that he has read the foregoing, 
knows the contents thereof and believes the same to be true of his own personal knowledge 
and as to those matters stated upon his knowledge, believes them to be true. 
HV\OAAJL &f)( 
NOTARY PUBLIC, residing in 
MARIE COX 
Notary Public, Ingham County, M l — 
My Commission Expires 02/24/2006 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the _£_ day of FewWy,: 2002 I caused to be delivered by the method 
indicated below, a true and correct copy of the attached and foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF TROY 
ALAN BROKA IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY OF 
READING, PA'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT to the following: 
VIA FACSIMILE 
yC VTA HAND DELIVERY 
VIA U.S. MAIL 
VIA FEDERAL EXPRESS 
Terry Rooney 
Julianne P. Blanch 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Plaintiff U of U Hospital and U of U 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-5000 
VTA FACSIMILE 
XT VIA HAND DELIVERY 
VIA U.S. MAIL 
VIA FEDERAL EXPRESS 
Bret Gardner 
CROWTHER & GARDNER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance 
Company 
1121 East 3900 South, Building C, #200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84124 
3»l 
ADDENDUM H 
District Court's October 7,2002 Memorandum Decision and December 30,2002 
Order granting summary judgment in American Casualty's favor 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH HOSPITAL and 
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CONTINENTAL CASUALTY dba CNA 
INSURANCE COMPANIES, an 
Illinois corporation, 
Defendant. 
ST. PAUL FIRE AND MARINE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, a Minnesota 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY OF 
READING, PA and TROY ALAN 
BROKA, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No.980913150 
Hon. GLENN K. IWASAKI 
Court Clerk: Janet Banks 
October 4, 2002 
The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to 
Cross Motions for Summary Judgment and American Casualty Company of 
Reading, PA's Motion to Strike Portions of the Affidavit of Lynn 
Faldmo. The Court heard oral argument with respect to the motions 
on September 6, 2002. Following the hearing, the Court granted the 
parties time for additional briefing. 
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The Court having received the additional briefing and 
considered the motions, memoranda, exhibits attached thereto and 
for the good cause shown hereby enters the following ruling. 
Addressing first the Motion to Strike, after reviewing the 
Affidavit and Supplemental Affidavit of Ms. Faldmo, the Court is 
persuaded it is subject to appropriate exceptions to the hearsay 
rule and, further, any deficiencies with regard to personal 
knowledge have been cured. Accordingly, the motion is denied. 
Turning next to the Cross Motions for Summary Judgment, the 
plaintiffs, University of Utah and University of Utah Hospital 
(collectively "the University") settled a claim brought by a widow, 
Susan Hepworth, whose husband died, allegedly due to a nurse's 
negligence. The University secured an agreement from Mrs. Hepworth 
releasing it and its agents and employees from all liability 
connected with the patient's death and paid $1 million of its own 
money to help settle the lawsuit.1 
With this Complaint, the University seeks subrogation and 
contribution.' Specifically, the University seeks a ruling form 
this Court that American Casualty Company of Reading, PA 
("American") is the primary insurance policy covering the nurse, 
'The University's lawsuit was consolidated with a lawsuit 
brought by St. Paul Fire &. Marine Insurance Company against 
American. St. Paul also seeks reimbursement for monies it 
contributed to the settlement. 
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Troy Alan Broka ("Nurse Broka"), and that American is, therefore, 
primarily responsible for covering Nurse Broka, and, consequently, 
must reimburse the University for monies paid toward the 
settlement.2 
With their motion for summary judgment, the University asks 
this Court to Rule as a matter of law that American is Nurse 
Broka's primary insurance carrier.3 Specifically, notes the 
University, American asserts the other insurance clause in the 
policy issued to Nurse Broka makes the policy excess to the 
University's self-insurance program.4 This is nonsensical, asserts 
the University, as Nurse Broka did not have his own self-insurance 
program and although the University has a self-insurance program, 
the clause does not state that it extends to "self-insurance 
2The University is self-insured for professional liability 
claims up to $1 million-when there is not insurance available to 
cover the particular claim. 
JA determination of amount is not sought. 
4Section VII OTHER INSURANCE provides: 
If other valid and collectible insurance is 
available to you for a claim we cover under 
this policy, our obligations are limited as 
follows: 
Excess Insurance 
This insurance is excess over any other 
insurance, self-insurance, self-insured 
retention or similar programs, whether 
primary, excess, contingent or on any other 
basis. 
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programs of others." Indeed, argues the University, it never 
reviewed the policy and never agreed to act as Nurse Broka's 
primary liability insurance. 
Next, the University asserts American's interpretation of 
"other insurance" is overboard and renders the policy worthless as 
hospitals have risk allocation systems in place, whether through 
self-insurance programs or insurance policies and under American's 
view of the clause, it would never need to pay a claim against one 
of its insureds because the hospital that employed the nurse will 
always be self-insured or have its own insurance coverage. 
Moreover, it is the University's position that even if the 
"other insurance" clause is interpreted as American urges, the 
clause runs counter to public policy requiring an insurer to cover 
an insured when it bargained for the risk and received premium 
payments. Finally, contends the University, Utah courts will not 
enforce an insurance clause that serves to deprive the insured of 
coverage when the clause could not easily be found by the insured. 
American opposes the motion and brings its own motion for 
summary judgment arguing the Utah Governmental Immunity Act and 
controlling Utah case law, together, preclude Nurse Broka from 
incurring any personal liability for the underlying wrongful death 
matter and further prohibit the University or its insurer from 
seeking indemnification from the University's employees or their 
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employees' insurers in such circumstances.5 Moreover, argues 
American, it only insured Nurse Broka, who never had any monetary 
demands directly asserted against him by the underlying claimants.6 
Specifically, American notes that according to plaintiffs' 
complaint in this action, Nurse Broka negligently administered 
excess intravenous fluids to Mr. Hepworth, allegedly causing or 
contributing to Mr. Hepworth's death four days later. It is 
American's position, however, that plaintiffs have not alleged 
Nurse Broka was acting outside the course and scope of his duties 
in connection with those acts. Further, argues American, there 
were several other employees at the University who were potentially 
responsible for any excess administration of fluids or surrounding 
events. 
The University opposes American's cross motion arguing the 
Governmental Immunity Act does not bar the University's claims for 
subrogation and equitable subrogation. Specifically, the 
University notes Utah Code Ann. §63-30-38 states that if a 
-""Indeed, asserts American, allowing the University or St. Paul 
to recover from Nurse Broka's insurer, when they are barred by 
statute from recovering from Nurse Broka, would abrogate the 
purpose of the Governmental Immunity Act. 
6With respect to St. Paul, American contends it insured the 
University and all of its employees and the settlement was designed 
to cover every employee of the University who was involved in 
providing care to Mr. Hepworth. In sum, it is American's position 
St. Paul did no more than protect its own interests and those of 
its insureds by it's participation in the Hepworth settlement. 
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governmental entity settles a claim against an employee, "the 
employee" may not be required to indemnify the entity. This 
section, argues the University, does not say that the employee's 
private insurer does not need to indemnify the entity. Similarly, 
asserts the University, Utah Code Ann. §63-30-33(1) (c) states that 
a governmental entity's "insurer" has no right of indemnification 
or contribution from the employee. While the legislature was 
careful to protect employees from indemnifying their employer, it 
is the University's position they did not draft a provision 
preventing the governmental employer from seeking indemnification 
from the employee's insurer. Additionally, with respect to the 
cases cited by American, the University notes that none address the 
situation where insurer was a self-insured governmental body. 
Furthermore, argues the University, if American's 
interpretation of the Act were correct, the policy it provided to 
Nurse Broka would be worthless. Indeed, contends the University, 
American maintains that under the Act the University would be 
solely responsible for losses occasioned by its insured's 
negligence and that its policy would never be triggered because 
Nurse Broka supposedly would never be "legally obligated to pay" 
due to his employer's duty to indemnify him. According to the 
University, when American was initially invited to participate in 
the Hepworth settlement, they refused solely on the basis of the 
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"other insurance" exclusion in the policy. Consequently, argues 
the University, American waived any right to assert the 
Governmental Immunity Act as an excuse of its obligation to 
contribute. 
Finally, the University contends it does not matter that Mrs. 
Hepworth did not demand the money directly from Nurse Broka. 
Specifically, the University notes that its subrogation claim is 
against American, not Nurse Broka, and American was on notice from 
the outset that a third party was pursuing a claim arising from its 
insured's negligence.7 
St. Paul joins in the University's opposition and argues in 
addition that because both it and American insured Nurse Broka for 
the same risk, St. Paul is entitled to equitable contribution from 
American for its portion of the loss paid by St. Paul to the 
Hepworths. Indeed, notes St. Paul, its claim for equitable 
contribution (not subrogation) is not precluded by any argument 
that American stands in the shoes of Broka, because St. Paul is not 
required to stand in the shoes of the Hospital with respect to 
Broka's defense and, thus, becomes subject to the defense. The 
right of equitable contribution is not derivative and is not 
7It is the University's position American's duty does not 
depend upon Nurse Broka's receipt of a demand for money. Indeed, 
notes the University, the policy defines "claim" as "receipt by you 
of a demand for money or services naming you and alleging a medical 
incident." 
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dependant upon any rights against indemnity the Broka may have 
under the Act. 
Summary judgment is appropriate only if no genuine issue of 
material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). "In considering a 
summary judgment motion, the Court must evaluate all the evidence 
and all reasonable inferences fairly drawn from the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment." 
Cinder v. A.L. Williams & Assocs., 739 P.2d 634, 634 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987). 
Applying the aforementioned to the facts of this case, it is 
important to note the University essentially concedes that the 
Hepworths made no "claim" within the meaning of the American policy 
against Nurse Broka. This is critical as the American's policy is 
only triggered by a "claim" or an insured's legal obligation to pay 
some amount. In other words, Nurse Broka never had any claims made 
against him and never became legally obligated to pay anything to 
the Hepworths in connection with the University's and. St. Paul's 
settlement of the University's liability to the Hepworths. 
Accordingly, none of American's obligations under the policy it 
issued to Nurse Broka ever matured. Consequently, American is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
With respect to St. Paul, there can be no claim for 
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contribution among insurers unless one insurer was equally 
obligated to provide coverage to the same insurer for the same 
risk, yet failed to do so. Here the obligations triggered by the 
Hepworths' demands were those of the University and its insurer, 
St. Paul, for amounts in excess of the University's retained limit. 
The Hepworth's made no demand that would have triggered the 
American policy. 
Based upon the forgoing, American's Motion for Summary 
Judgment is granted. Consequently, the University's motion is, 
respectfully, denied.8 
DATED this ( day of October, 2002. 
8In light of the forgoing ruling, the Court does not reach the 
issue of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, nor the constitutional 
issues surrounding the Act. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on thellthdav of OCTOBER. 2002,1 mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing order, postage prepaid thereon, to the following: 
JARYL L. RENCHER 
10 WEST 100 SOUTH #500 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101 
ALEC BARINHOLTZ 
JENNIFER MATHIS 
5 PARK PLAZA, SUITE 1200 
IRVINE, CA 92614-8529 
TERRY ROONEY 
JULIANNE P BLANCH 
PO BOX 45000 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84145-5000 
BRET GARDNER 
1121 EAST 3900 SOUTH BLDG C #200 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84124 
DISTRICT COURT CLERK 
BY: ,^jU~^ ^ P^t 
/ DEPUTY CLERK 
iv 
Jaryl L. Rencher #4903 
EPPERSON & RENCHER, PC 
10 West 100 South, #500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 983-9800 
Alec Barinholtz (pro fjac Vice) 
Jennifer Mathis (pro Hac Vice) 
ROSS, DIXON & BELL, L.L.P. 
5 Park Plaza, Suite 1200 
Irvine, California 92614-8529 
Telephone: (949) 622-2700 
Attorneys for Defendant American Casualty Company of Reading, PA 
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THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH HOSPITAL and 
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY OF 
READING, PA 
ST. PAUL FIRE AND MARINE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, a Minnesota 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY OF 
READING, PA, and TROY ALAN 
BROKA, 
Defendants. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT ON 
PARTIES' MOTIONS FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case Nor9S091-3-r59G 
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
819836 v2 
Plaintiffs University of Utah and University of Utah Hospital's Motion for Summary 
Judgment (in which plaintiff St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company joined), defendant 
American Casualty Company of Reading PA's Motion for Summary Judgment, and American 
Casualty's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Lynn Faldmo came on for hearing before the Court 
on September 6, 2002. Following the hearing, St. Paul and American Casualty submitted 
supplemental briefing. 
Having heard oral argument and having read and considered all papers and supporting 
documents submitted in connection with the parties' motions, the Court issued a memorandum 
decision dated and signed October 7, 2002, wherein the Court granted American Casualty's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, denied the University's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
denied American Casualty's Motion to Strike. 
For the reasons set forth in the Court's October 7, 2002 memorandum decision, IT IS 
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT JUDGMENT BE ENTERED 
FORTHWITH in favor of defendant American Casualty Company of Reading, PA and against 
plaintiffs the University of Utah and University Hospital and St. Paul Fire and Miarine Insurance 
Company and that plaintiffs' lawsuit against American Casualty be dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this 7 ^ day of h 
The Honorable GlennKT 
Third Judicial District Court Judge 
ADDENDUM I 
Court of Appeals' July 21,2003 order dismissing plaintiff St. Paul's appeal 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
University of Utah Hospital 
and University of Utah, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
American Casualty Company of 
Reading, PA, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
JUL 2 1 2003 
Paulette Stagg 
Cferk of the Court 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Case No. 20030070-CA 
Before Judges Davis, Greenwood, and Thorne. 
This matter is before the Court upon the Appellant, St. Paul 
Fire & Marine Insurance Companys', stipulation for withdrawal of 
appeal, filed July 15, 2003, pursuant to Rule 37, Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
Now therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the appeal as to 
St. Paul Marine Insurance Company, is dismissed. 
Dated th is £^f day of July, 2003. 
FOR THE COURT: 
Dated this Q\ day of July, 2003 
By r i i ^ O u Ln,§Juuyia 
Lisa Collins 
Deputy Clerk 
Case No.: 20030070-CA 
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE, #980913150 
